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I. OVERVIEW
As globalization draws the community of nations more closely together,
a body of law commonly referred to as the law of the sea represents an im-
portant mechanism for ensuring that the rule of law governs the relations be-
tween nations as they use the oceans for trade, for resource exploitation, for
communications, and for many other activities. Much of what was once cus-
tomary law governing the oceans has been codified by 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea'-and this international accord also codi-
fied evolving new regimes in the international law of the sea.
One of the new and evolving regimes codified by the 1982 United Na-
tions Treaty is that of a relatively new juridical concept called the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ).2 As defined by the Treaty, the EEZ "is an area be-
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* B.S., Emory University, 1978; J.D. summa cum laude, University of Baltimore School
of Law, 1985; LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1994.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3,
397, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
2. See generally, e.g., EDWARD D. BROWN, THE UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, 1982: A GUIDE FOR NATIONAL POLICY MAKING LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION,
BOOK 3, MARITIME ZONES UNDER THE UN CONVENTION II-EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE,
EXCLUSIVE FISHING ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF (1991); FRANCISCO 0. VICUNA, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, REGIME AND LEGAL NATURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1989); DAVID J. ATrARD, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-67,
277-307 (1987); Satya N. Nandan, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A historical perspective, in
THE LAW AND THE SEA: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JEAN CARROZ 171 (U. N. Food and Agricul-
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yond and adjacent to the territorial sea,"3 which "shall not extend beyond
200 nautical miles from the baselines4 from which the breadth of the territo-
rial sea is measured."5 It is not a part of the high seas, although high-seas-
like freedom exists there with respect to navigation.6 EEZ claims extract ap-
proximately 30 to 36 per cent of the world's oceans from waters traditionally
considered high seas.7 In the South Pacific, only pockets of the high seas re-
main. Enclosed seas, such as the Baltic, Black and South China seas, the
Arabian Gulf, and the Sea of Okhotsk, are particularly affected.8
The EEZ is a zone of shared rights and responsibilities. Coastal States
have the primary rights to the natural resources in the zone, while foreign
States retain the freedom of navigation and overflight through this zone.9 As
a relatively new regime in international law, the precise nature and full ex-
tent of coastal and other nations' rights and responsibilities in the EEZ are
still evolving.'" Often this evolution of rights and responsibilities has been
orderly and peaceful, however, this evolution has sometimes become conten-
tious and has the potential to become an area of conflict.
One of the areas least well addressed in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion-as well as in prior customary international law-is the subject of mili-
tary activities in the EEZ.I" Prior to the Law of the Sea Conferences in the
third quarter of the last century, this was not an issue because the EEZ re-
gime had not fully developed as a recognized rule of customary international
ture Organization, 1987); James E. Bailey, Comment, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Its De-
velopment and Future in International and Domestic Law, 45 LA. L. REV. 1269 (1985); KEN
Boom, LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA 5 (1985); Jorge Casteneda, Negotiations on the
Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 605 (1987).
3. UNCLOS art. 55.
4. The baseline is usually the coastline-the mean low watermark-but, can in some cir-
cumstances, such as that of a deeply indented coastline or line of fringing islands, be extended
from the beach by means of drawing straight baselines. See UNCLOS arts. 4-14.
5. UNCLOS art 57.
6. See UNCLOS art 87. This is not itself an entirely uncontroversial statement, but re-
flects the generally held view of the Convention's meaning. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 2, at
130; VICUNA, supra note 2, at 19; ATrARD, supra note 2, at 63; Nandan, supra note 2, at 188;
Casteneda, supra note 2, at 622.
7. See Boleslaw A. Boczek, Peacetime Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic
Zone of Third Countries, 19 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L. L. 445, 447 (1988); Robert Nadelson, The
Exclusive Economic Zone-State Claims and the LOS Convention, 16 MARINE PoL'Y 463, at
464-65 (1992); BooTH, supra note 2, at 137.
8. Boczek, supra note 7, at 447.
9. See UNCLOS arts. 55, 56, 57 & 58.
10. Cf Hugo Caminos, Harmonization of Pre-Existing 200-Mile Claims in the Latin
American Region with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its Exclusive
Economic Zone, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 9 (1998).
11. See generally John C. Meyer, The Impact of the Exclusive Economic Zone on Naval
Operations, 40 NAVAL L. REV. 241 (1992); Captain Stephen Rose, JAGC, USN, Naval Activ-
ity in the EEZ-Troubled Waters Ahead?, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 67 (1990); Boczek, supra note
7, at 445; Alan V. Lowe, Some Legal Problems Arising from the Use of the Seas for Military
Purposes, 10 MARINE POL'Y 171 (1986); BooTH, supra note 2, at 80-81.
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law. After the final Law of the Sea Conference, it did not immediately be-
come an issue because other activities in other regimes garnered more inter-
national attention.
Today, military activities by foreign nations in the Exclusive Economic
Zones of other nations are becoming more and more frequent for a number
of reasons: the accelerating pace of globalization; the tremendous increase in
world trade; the rise in the size and quality of the navies of many nations;
and technological advances that allow navies to exploit oceanic areas.
Along with this increase in military activity has come increasing contention
over the scope of rights to military activities within the EEZ. A small num-
ber of strategically placed countries interpret the Treaty to prohibit naval ac-
tivities and maneuvers in the EEZ without their prior permission. Those
countries include, for example, India, Malaysia, Brazil and Iran. 12 Others,
such as Thailand, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
the United States, disagree.13 Whether and to what extent high seas freedoms
of navigation and associated uses exist for warships and aircraft in the EEZ
has been the subject of a fair amount of discussion in academic literature.
Some have argued that it is difficult to conclusively determine just what the
Treaty means with respect to naval activities in the EEZ--that it is vague
and ambiguous.' 4 According to one commentator, 'The uncertainty [in the
Convention] is nowhere so striking as in the area of military uses of the
EEZ.'"5 Unfortunately, mechanisms to address these military activities and
12. See MARrIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANuAL, Department of Defense 2005. 1-M, at
http://www.dtic.mil.whs/directives/corres/2005 lm040201 (Apr. 2001). This manual provides a
general reference concerning the maritime claims of all coastal nations. According to its for-
ward:
The maritime claims references in this Manual represent claims made by the
coastal nations. Some of the claims are inconsistent with international law. The
United States does not recognize those maritime claims that are not in conformity
with customary international law, as reflected in the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea
Convention. Examples include excessive straight baseline claims, territorial sea
claims in excess of 12 nautical miles, and other claims that unlawfully impede
freedom of navigation and overflight. This Manual notes many instances in which
the United States has protested excessive claims and conducted operational asser-
tions against such excessive claims under the Freedom of Navigation Program.
Failure to categorize any maritime claim as excessive within this Manual does not
indicate U.S. acceptance of excessive claims.
Id.
13. For a brief discussion of this issue, see Michel Boubonnier & Louis Haeck, Military
Aircraft and International Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66 J. Am L. & COM. 885, 958 (2001). For
the declarations and statements made upon ratification, accession or succession with respect
to the Convention, see THE LAW OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT
TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND TO THE AGREEMENT
RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. Sales No. E.97.V.3 (1997), available at
http://www.un.orglDepts/los/convention-agreements/convention_declarations.
14. See generally infra notes 120 to 133 and accompanying text.
15. Boczek, supra note 7, at 458.
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means to resolve concomitant disputes arising from them are not as well de-
veloped as they might be.
This article examines the issue of military activities in the Exclusive
Economic Zone from various perspectives: from the perspective of custom-
ary international law versus the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea; and from the perspective of coastal nations versus maritime nations.
This article suggests that to depend only on the dispute resolution mecha-
nisms of the Law of the Sea Convention is to invite ongoing strife as these
mechanisms cannot adequately address military activities in the EEZ. It ar-
gues for continued international dialogue as a primary means to resolve these
issues and suggests that the maritime nations, especially the United States,
focus more intently on developing useful modalities to better establish that
the balance of rights in the EEZ encompasses military activities in the EEZs
of coastal States.
II. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
The concept of the EEZ, as we know it today, developed largely from
the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the 1982 United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. The Convention took over a decade to produce
and was the final result of the largest single international negotiating project
undertaken, before or since.16 One hundred and fifty-nine States and other
entities signed this comprehensive document containing 320 articles and
nine annexes, and over 130 nations have since ratified this Convention,
which covers virtually every aspect of the conduct of nations in the oceans
environment.1 7 In many ways, the Convention is much more than a piece of
paper-to the majority of the community of nations it represents a commit-
ment to the rule of law and a basis for the conduct of affairs among nations.
It is difficult to overstate the extent to which this Convention has be-
come more than a Treaty and has become, instead, an international state of
mind. It created new international law, codifying much of what had become
customary law of the sea, and established new norms in the negotiation of
multilateral, international treaty agreements. For many emerging nations, it
was the first major international treaty negotiation that they had ever partici-
pated in. According to former United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez
de Cuellar, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea em-
16. See generally JAMES B. MORELL, THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE 1982 TREATY AND ITS
REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES 22-95 (1992). The first session of the Conference was at-
tended by approximately 5000 delegates, representing 148 states, 10 United Nations agencies,
10 intergovernmental organizations, and 33 non-governmental organizations. Id. at 52.
17. As of Feb. 6, 2002, 157 States have signed UNCLOS and 138 States have ratified the
treaty. Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement re-
lating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the im-
plementation of the provisions of the Convention relating to the conservation and manage-
ment of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/referencefiles/status2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
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bodies the will of an overwhelming majority of nations from all parts of the
world, at different levels of development, and having diverse geographical
characteristics. 8
As in any major international negotiation, some issues were dealt with
extensively-while others received less intensive attention. Some of the
most compelling and intensive issues addressed by the thousands of dele-
gates to the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea included issues such as
the width of the territorial sea, the creation of a formal regime for passage
through straits used for international navigation, the right of transit passage
through these straits as well as passage through archipelagoes, the mining of
minerals on the ocean's floor, and a number of other contentious issues.
Many of these considerations became issues because they attempted to
codify imperfect understandings that had grown from customary interna-
tional law. One such issue, which became the subject of particularly intense
negotiations, was the regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In or-
der to understand how this issue became the subject of such controversy, it is
important to understand the development of this issue over the course of the
twentieth century.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Battle for Control of the Sea
Like the transformation of a river's fresh flowing water into that of the
salty sea, the transition from territorial seas to high seas is not abrupt. There
is no clear and bright line, but rather a region where the sea absorbs and di-
lutes the silty residue of sovereign ground, gradually replacing its fresh,
muddy, provincial brown with salt and clear blue water freedom. Currents
carrying elements of coastal State sovereignty and jurisdiction converge and
combine in the EEZ with those containing freedoms of navigation and asso-
ciated uses in favor of all States, swirling and twisting in sometimes compet-
ing directions. The EEZ is, in a juridical sense, brackish, murky and treach-
erous water; a 188 mile-wide band of turbulent ocean separating the
territorial sea from the high seas in which competing desires for control and
use meet, mix and merge. The EEZ is a zone of tension between coastal
State control and maritime State use of the sea. The battle for control defines
the exclusive economic zone. In the battle for control, it is a demilitarized
zone, where neither coastal State nor maritime State rights prevail, yet both,
in varying degrees, exist.
To understand the law of the EEZ, one must answer the following ques-
tions: What is the relationship of coastal State sovereignty to its rights in the
18. Shruti Ravikumar, Adrift at Sea: U.S. Interests and the Law of the Sea, 22 HARv.
INT'L REV. 38, 38 (2000).
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EEZ? How great and of what nature is coastal State control of the EEZ? To
what extent do maritime nations enjoy high seas freedoms, therefore free-
dom from coastal State interference, in the EEZ? To what extent may a war-
ship lawfully use the seas of a foreign EEZ during peacetime?
B. Historical Development of the EEZ
To learn the answers, that is, to grasp the juridical nature of the mixture
of the water constituting the EEZ, requires an understanding of the historical
development of the EEZ in customary international law.19 Its very name re-
flects an extension of an exclusionary regime,20 which implies something of
a victory for coastal States. It therefore seems ironic that it is in the act of a
great maritime power that we find its genesis.2' In its two proclamations of
September 28, 1945, the United States of America declared control over ma-
rine resources and coastal fisheries beyond its territorial sea,22 and opened
the floodgates for claims of State sovereignty over the high seas. Until these
proclamations (generally referred to collectively as the "Truman Proclama-
tion"), the well established rule of customary international law provided that
the coastal State exercised its sovereignty only over its three mile territorial
sea.23 "No State was allowed to extend its exclusive jurisdiction to the area
19. See generally VICUNA, supra note 2, at 3-9, 228-56; ATTARD, supra note 2, at 1-67,
277-307; and Bailey, supra note 2.
20. But see BROWN, supra note 2, at 131 ("It may be less obvious, but it is nonetheless
the case, that the sovereign rights of the coastal state over the economic resources of the zone
are by no means as exclusive as the name of the zone might suggest.") (emphasis in original).
21. Ar-rARD, supra note 2, at 2 ("Ironically, it was the United States, one of the staunch-
est supporters of the 3-n.m. territorial sea doctrine, that opened an era of extensive maritime
claims.") (citation omitted).
22. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States with Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea-Bed of the Continental Shelf, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303
(Sept 28, 1945) (President Harry S. Truman); Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, Policy of
the United States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 Fed.
Reg. 12304 (Sept 28, 1945) (President Harry S. Truman). In Proclamation No. 2667, the
United States declared,
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its natural
resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources of the
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to
the coasts of the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control.
In Proclamation No. 2668:
In view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of fishery resources,
the Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conservation
zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States
wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and main-
tained on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be
developed and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States regards it as
proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activi-
ties shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States.
23. UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICE OF
258
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beyond that limit, which remained the high seas, where all States enjoyed the
freedom to exploit living and non-living resources. '2' The Truman Procla-
mation is generally viewed as the "first important assertion... of exclusive
jurisdiction beyond the territorial sea. ' '25
While both statements added that neither the legal character of the ocean
as high seas nor freedom of navigation would be affected, the Truman Proc-
lamation had a "profound impact on the practice of States."26 To some
States, the United States appeared to claim some sort of sovereign control
beyond the territorial sea.27 Other States followed. 28 Two years later, in
1947, Chile and Peru declared authority over ocean zones extending 200
miles from their coasts.29 Both States, like the United States, based their as-
sertion of control on the protection of natural resources and fisheries.30 From
LEGAL AFFAIRS, THE LAW OF THE SEA, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ARTICLES 56, 58 AND 59 OF TIE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA I
(1992)I[hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
24. Id.
25. Nandan, supra note 2, at 174. "An earlier document, 'The Submarine Areas of the
Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order' was issued in 1942 by the United Kingdom.... However,
the Truman Proclamation contained a rationale for the continental shelf and must be consid-
ered to be the most important, if not the first, legal instrument dealing with the subject." Id. at
175 n.4. See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 1; ATTARD, supra note 2, at 1. But
see VICUNA, supra note 2, at 3 ("The maritime zone which today is known as the exclusive
economic zone originates in the proclamation by the President of Chile in 1947, which
claimed sovereignty over the continental shelf and the adjacent seas up to a distance of 200
miles.").
26. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 2.
27. Bailey, supra note 2, at 1291 n.157.
The first Truman Declaration claimed the resources of the continental shelf. The
second Truman Declaration made no resource claims, but simply announced that
the United States had the right to make international agreements concerning fish-
ing off its coasts. Unfortunately, the simultaneous release of the first declaration
and the confusing wording of the second declaration so confused other nations that
many felt they were simply following suit when they claimed a 200-mile resource
zone or patrimonial sea.
Id.
28. See ATTARD, supra note 2, at 4, 5 (In 1945 and 1946, Mexico and Argentina pro-
posed an "epicontinental sea" which claimed the seas over the continental shelf subject to na-
tional sovereignty. Panama followed in 1946, Nicaragua in 1947.).
29. Nandan, supra note 2, at 175 (citing Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental
Shelf of 23 June 1947, EL MERCURIO, Santiago de Chile (June 29, 1947), and Presidential
Decree No. 781 of 1 Aug 1947, 107 EL PERUANO: DIARIO OFFICIAL, No. 1983, (Aug. 11,
1947)).
30. VICUNA, supra note 2, at 3 ("[Slaid zone did not have a territorial scope, but referred
solely to the utilization of natural resources and related aspects."). The Chilean statement de-
clared:
sovereignty over submarine areas, regardless of their size and depth, as well as
over the adjacent seas extending as far as necessary to preserve, protect, maintain,
and utilize natural resources and wealth'. It further established the demarcation of
'protection zones for whaling and deep sea fishery' to extend 200 nautical miles
from the coasts of Chilean territory.
259
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1948 to 1951, other Latin American States made similar claims.3" In 1949,
ten Arab States and emirates jumped on the bandwagon, unilaterally declar-
ing sovereignty over petroleum resources on the continental shelf.32 Al-
though none of these declarations purported to limit freedom of navigation, 33
an outward-bound movement of coastal State control of the sea had begun.
In 1952, the movement continued with the Santiago Declaration,34 the
first international instrument to declare a 200-mile limit.35 The Declaration
made a significant conceptual leap, however, asserting not merely jurisdic-
tion for the purpose of managing natural resources and fisheries, but that
each State (Chile, Ecuador and Peru) "possesses sole sovereignty and juris-
diction over the area of sea adjacent to its own country and extending not
less than 200 nautical miles from the said coast."36 Freedom of navigation
was restricted to "the innocent and inoffensive passage of vessels of all na-
tions through the zone aforesaid.- 37 Although motivated by a desire "to en-
sure the conservation and protection of its natural resources,"38 this declara-
tion of sole sovereignty claimed control based on territorial ownership over a
large area of what had, until then, been high seas. 39 Further, by permitting
Nandan, supra note 2, at 175 (quoting Presidential Declaration Concerning Continental Shelf
of 23 June 1947, EL MERCURIO, Santiago de Chile June 29, 1947). Peru also established a
200-mile zone. Id. (citing Presidential Decree No. 781 of 1 Aug. 1947), 107 EL PERUANO:
DIARIo OFFICIAL, No. 1983, (Aug. 11, 1947)). The source of the "magic" 200 mile number
apparently derives from a magazine article discussing the Panama Declaration of 1939 in
which the United Kingdom and the United States established a security and neutrality zone
around the American continents to prevent resupply of Axis ships in South American ports.
The magazine article included a map showing the width of the neutrality zone to be 200
miles. Nandan, supra note 2, at 175. See also ATrARD, supra note 2, at 5. The irony contin-
ues: it was from an act of world's two greatest maritime powers that the 200 mile territorial
sea limit, anathema to both, derived.
31. ATTARD, supra note 2, at 5-6 (Costa Rica in 1948, modified in 1949. El Salvador in
1950, Honduras in 1951.).
32. Nandan, supra note 2, at 175.
33. Id.
34. Declaration on the Maritime Zone (the Santiago Declaration), adopted by Chile, Ec-
uador and Peru at the First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime
Resources of the South Pacific on 18 August 1952, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE I-ISTORY, supra
note 23, at 3 [hereinafter the Santiago Declaration].
35. Nandan, supra note 2, at 176.
36. Santiago Declaration, supra note 34, at 3 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 4. "It should be noted that [this], though it refers to 'innocent and inoffensive
passage of vessels', has been interpreted to have the intention of confirming the freedom of
navigation." Id. (citing Edmund V. Carreno, America Latina y los Problems Contemporaneos
del Derecho del Mar 27-28 (Santiago, 1973)). But see Nandan, supra note 2, at 176 ("The
Declaration... maintained the principle of innocent passage but not.., freedom of naviga-
tion."); VICUNA, supra note 2, at 5 ("[T]his did not prevent the use of the concept of innocent
passage instead of that of freedom of navigation in the zone."). The language unambiguously
restricts rights associated with the freedom of navigation, paring them to the bare nub of inno-
cent passage, and cannot reasonably be interpreted as confirming the full panoply of uses as-
sociated with freedom of navigation on the high seas.
38. Santiago Declaration, supra note 34, at 3.
39. But see VICUNA, supra note 2, at 5 ("[lIt could not be inferred that the Declaration of
8
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only innocent passage, it limited rights of use associated with freedom of
navigation, thus restricting maritime States when using these waters.
In 1958, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea pro-
duced four conventions codifying the customary law of the sea.' Although
these conventions rejected the extended territorial sea claimed in the Santi-
ago Declaration," the Convention on the Continental Shelf provided a small
victory for those seeking extended coastal State control, recognizing "sover-
eign rights of coastal States on the soil and subsoil of the continental shelf,
beyond the territorial sea."42 Customary international law did not provide,
however, for any further coastal State rights of exclusion beyond the territo-
rial sea.4 3 A second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, held
in 1959, formed no consensus on the reach of the territorial sea, although a
majority favored extension beyond the then customary 3-mile limit." Unde-
terred, a number of Latin American countries made unilateral claims to ex-
tended sovereignty over the sea; by 1970, eight countries claimed sover-
eignty to 200 miles.45
In 1970, these Latin American States "somewhat solidified"'46 their posi-
tion in two international agreements: the Montevideo Convention on the
Law of the Sea,47 and the Declaration of Latin American States on the Law
of the Sea (Lima Declaration).48 Both conventions expressed concern over
"abusive" practices in the extraction of marine resources, and "disturbance"
of ecological balance.49 Both declared that coastal States had a right to estab-
Santiago establishes a territorial sea claim, since it does not embody the elements which
would justify its typification in such terms.").
40. Casteneda, supra, note 2, at 605 (citing Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con-
tiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958,
459 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29,
1958, 449 U.N.T.S. 311).
41. Nandan, supra note 2, at 176.
42. Casteneda, supra note 2, at 605.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 606.
45. Nandan, supra note 2, at 176. (Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, Chile, Peru, El Salvador,
Argentina and Nicaragua claimed sovereignty to 200 miles). See also ATTARD, supra note 2,
at 14, 15, 17, 19 (discussing claims of Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Panama, Uruguay, and
Brazil).
46. Nandan, supra note 2, at 176.
47. Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, adopted on May 8, 1970 at the Mon-
tevideo Meeting on the Law of the Sea, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at
4 [hereinafter Montevideo Declaration]. Signatories were Ecuador, Panama, Brazil, Chile,
Peru, El Salvador, Argentina and Nicaragua. Nandan, supra note 2, at 176, 177.
48. Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, adopted on 8 August
1970 at the Latin American Meeting on Aspects of the Law of the Sea, held at Lima from 4 to
8 August 1970, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 6 [hereinafter Lima
Convention]. The signatories to the Lima convention included Colombia, the Dominican Re-
public, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, in addition to the signatories of the Montevideo
convention. Nandan, supra note 2, at 177.
49. Montevideo Declaration, supra note 47; Lima Convention, supra note 48.
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lish the limits of maritime sovereignty or jurisdiction as each deemed neces-
sary to protect national interests in the preservation of the marine environ-
ment." The conventions contemplated a reasonable relationship between the
limits of sovereignty and the need to control and preserve natural resources.
The underlying purpose for asserting sovereignty was to gain control of the
waters to apply regulatory measures for these purposes." These regulatory
measures were to be "without prejudice to freedom of navigation and over-
flight in transit of ships and aircraft, without distinction as to flag."52
A clear theme had emerged. These coastal States did not purport to seek
sovereignty for its own sake, for the sake of pure territorial expansion, or for
defense of the nation from a military threat.53 They rationalized their need
for sovereignty as needed to protect and utilize the natural resources of their
marine environment. Their interests were economic and environmental in
nature. It followed, therefore, that uses associated with the exercise of free-
dom of navigation, to the extent that they did not intrude upon or harm these
interests, were not at issue. The control they claimed to seek was of a limited
nature; so, the exclusion required could be limited to that necessary to pre-
serve and protect the stated environmental and economic interests. The claim
of sovereignty, with its associated rights of total territorial ownership, con-
50. Montevideo Declaration, supra note 47; Lima Convention, supra note 48.
51. Montevideo Declaration supra note 47, U1 1-5, at 5; Lima Convention, supra note 48,
U 1-6, at 7.
52. Lima Convention, supra note 48, 3, at 7; Montevideo Declaration supra note 47, 91
6, at 5. The language in the two is not identical. The earlier Montevideo Convention states
"without prejudice to freedom of navigation by ships and overflying by aircraft of any flag."
The Lima Convention, perhaps significantly, says "without prejudice to freedom of naviga-
tion and flight in transit of ships and aircraft, without distinction as to flag." (emphasis
added). This latter language appears to limit the freedom to a right of pass through, and does
not permit a vessel to tarry-perhaps a version of innocent passage, though not explicitly
stated. Indeed, as to the Montevideo Convention, five signatories attached to the Declaration a
restrictive interpretation, equating it with innocent passage. Similarly, at the Lima Conven-
tion, "most states" made reservations to the effect that the language providing freedom of
navigation did not apply to them. ArrARD, supra note 2, at 18, 19. The Lima Convention did,
however, explicitly recognize that scientific research might occur in its waters, and did not
seek to prohibit it as a matter of sovereign right; instead asserting a right to "authorize, super-
vise and participate." Lima Convention, supra note 48, 91 5, at 7. The Lima Convention also
asserted a right "to prevent contamination of the waters and other dangerous and harmful ef-
fects that may result from the use, exploration or exploitation of the area adjacent to its
coasts." Id. 4. These provisions with respect to scientific research and contamination result-
ing from use appear to imply or assume that the sovereignty declared would not be com-
pletely exclusive of uses traditionally enjoyed by maritime nations on the high seas in the ex-
ercise of freedom of navigation. Thus, although the quantity of water claimed expanded, the
quality of the claim relaxed-from total exclusion to a slightly more permissive, though regu-
lated, regime.
53. See ATrAPD, supra note 2, at 7 ("[Tlhey claimed sovereignty over areas of the high
seas with the purpose of exercising only certain functions of this sovereignty, primarily the
exclusive control over fishing."). But see VICUNA, supra note 2, at 6 ("[Some Latin Ameri-
can] countries preferred a restrictive approach to navigation through the zone ... aim[ed] at
the safeguarding of their concepts of security or simply their desire for territorial expansion in
marine space.").
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trol and exclusion, was a blunt instrument with which to accomplish this
limited purpose. The operation required a tool of more precise and circum-
scribed application, so as to leave intact traditional uses of the sea associated
with freedom of the high seas (which includes freedom of navigation for
warships), while cutting away, for coastal State control, those uses associ-
ated with protecting, preserving and using the marine environment and its
natural resources.
A regional group of Asian-African States recognized this subtlety, sug-
gesting at its Colombo meeting in 1971 that an extension of the territorial
sea (i.e. coastal State sovereignty) beyond 12 miles was inappropriate, but at
the same time recognizing a coastal State right to "claim exclusive rights to
economic exploitation of the resources in the waters adjacent to the territo-
rial sea in a zone the maximum breadth of which should be subject to nego-
tiation."54 In January 1972, the Asian-African group developed a working
paper on the "Exclusive Economic Zone Concept."55 This paper, presented
by Kenya, drew the battle lines over sovereignty between the developed
countries and those in the developing process. It stated, "the present regime
of the high seas benefits only the developed countries.... "56 In defining the
conflict, however, the Kenyans recognized that extending sovereignty was a
clumsy means to the desired end. Instead, they suggested giving the coastal
State sovereign rights and exclusive jurisdiction, not over the sea itself, but
instead over living and non-living resources in and beneath the sea, and over
the prevention and control of pollution in a zone of ocean up to 200 miles
from the coast.57
A number of Caribbean States took a consistent view, suggesting that
sovereignty over the sea itself might be inappropriate, but that beyond the
54. Report of the Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea of the Asian-African Legal Con-
sultative Committee, adopted by the Committee at its twelfth session, held at Colombo, 18-27
January 1971, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 7.
55. Nandan, supra note 2, at 178.
56. Id. (quoting Report of the Thirteenth Session of the Asian-African Consultative
Committee, Lagos, 18-25 January 1972). As described by Satya N. Nandan, the United Na-
tions Under Secretary General, Special Representative of the Secretary General for the Law of
the Sea:
The developed countries, because of their advanced technologies, were able to en-
gage in distant-water fishing activities wherever and whenever they chose to do so.
At the same time, developing countries were often incapable of exploiting the re-
sources in waters closely adjacent to their own coasts, much less in waters great
distances away. Therefore, a tendency had grown among developing countries to
extend their territorial seas up to 200 miles in an effort to compensate for their
technologically disadvantaged position. This tendency, in turn, created a concern
among the major maritime nations that extensions of sovereignty would have a
negative effect on traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight. The exclusive
economic zone concept was put forward as a compromise solution to these con-
flicting concerns.
Id. at 178-79.
57. Id. at 179.
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territorial sea, coastal States should have "sovereign rights over renewable
and non-renewable natural resources, which are found in the waters, in the
sea-bed and in the subsoil... ." They named this region of limited resource
sovereignty beyond the territorial sea the "patrimonial sea.""8 To the extent
permitted by the exercise of coastal State sovereignty over the resources (not
the sea), "ships and aircraft of all States... should enjoy the right of free-
dom of navigation and overflight with no restrictions... there will also be
freedom for the laying of submarine cables and pipelines." 9 At almost the
same time, an African regional group of sixteen States made a similar decla-
ration, claiming "the right to establish beyond the territorial sea an economic
zone over which they will have exclusive jurisdiction for the purpose of con-
trol, regulation and national exploitation of the living resources of the sea...
and for the purpose of the prevention and control of pollution."' The subse-
quent African Unity Declaration6 gave "further authority" to this position.62
This exclusive zone concept, "initiated by a few Latin American States,
refined by Caribbean States, and defined explicitly by African States," 63 im-
mediately became a subject of discussion in the United Nations Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of
National Jurisdiction (Sea-bed Committee). 4 In this forum, the maritime
powers, notably the United States and the Soviet Union,6 5 sought to "ensure
that the strategic use of the zone was in no way curtailed and that the tradi-
tional freedoms of the high seas for non-resource related activities were pre-
served. '66 Strategic use of the sea was closely connected to naval presence.
58. Declaration of Santo Domingo, approved 9 June 1972 at the Specialized Conference
of the Caribbean Countries on Problems of the Sea, Santo Domingo, 31 May - 9 June 1972,
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23 at 8, 9 [hereinafter Santo Domingo Declara-
tion]. The Declaration also provided for coastal state regulation of marine research as well as
the right to adopt necessary measures to "prevent marine pollution and to ensure its sover-
eignty over the resources of the area." Id. at 9. Fifteen Caribbean states attended the confer-
ence: Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela; El Salvador and
Guyana attended as observers. Nandan, supra note 2, at 177.
59. Santo Domingo Declaration, supra note 58, 1 5, at 9.
60. Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the
Law of the Sea, June 20-30, 1972, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 9, 10.
61. Organization of African Unity Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea,
adopted by the Council of Ministers at its Twenty First Ordinary Session, May 17- 24, 1973,
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 11.
62. Nandan, supra note 2, at 179.
63. Id. at 180.
64. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 14-15.
65. Casteneda, supra note 2, at 606.
66. Nandan, supra note 2, at 180. This negotiating position had its origin in the so-called
"package deal," when the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to promote a 12-mile
territorial sea (extended from the then existing 3 mile limit) with guaranteed free navigation
through straits combined with a preferential fishing rights regime for coastal states beyond the
12 mile territorial sea. See JAMES C.F. WANG, HANDBOOK ON OCEAN POLITICS & LAW 465
(1992); ANNE L. HOLLICK, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1981). See also
RICHARD M. NIXON, DEP'T STATE. BULL 62, No. 1602, U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's
12
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To preserve naval presence as a matter of right required a rule of inclusion-
that is, unconditional rights of use-such as traditionally existed on the high
seas. Sovereignty, even of a limited nature, implied rights of exclusion held
by coastal States. Maritime powers perceived an exclusive regime based
upon sovereign rights as a threat to their ability to use the sea by potentially
denying them a legal right to be there.67 Nevertheless, acquiescing to the in-
evitable, they accepted the exclusive zone concept in principle. 68 In an effort
to avoid any assertion of sovereignty beyond the territorial sea, however, and
using fishing rights as a vehicle to carry their underlying strategic con-
cerns, 69 maritime powers suggested a regime of preferential fishing rights as
an alternative to sovereign resource rights.7"
Conversely, some of the Latin American States insisted upon a 200-mile
territorial sea, "including all its characteristics."'" Brazil, Ecuador, Peru,
Uruguay, and, to a degree, Argentina, all zealously maintained their territo-
rial position.72 In draft articles on the exclusive zone submitted to the Sea-
Bed Committee in 1973,73 Ecuador, Panama and Peru contended that the
coastal State's right to regulate and exploit the living resources in the zone
was "a consequence of the exercise of its sovereignty, from which it could
not be disassociated."74 Of course, both the Kenyan exclusive economic zone
concept and the Caribbean patrimonial sea suggestion had demonstrated the
very conceptual disassociation these Latin American States denied.75 Rights
to resources, like easements in property, can, at least in theory, be separated
from other rights, and need not be held inseparable from the right of posses-
329-30 (March 9, 1970); JOHN R. STEVENSON, DEP'T STATE. BuLL 62, No. 1603,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE OcEANs 339-43 (March 16, 1970) (public pronouncements that
the United States would accept a 12 mile territorial sea provided that free transit through
straits was assured).
67. See Nandan, supra note 2, at 178, 179.
68. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 606.
From the start, it seemed obvious to them... that if such a goal were to be at-
tained, it was indispensable to give some sort of satisfaction to a great number of
coastal States, probably a majority, who claimed an effective way of checking ex-
cessive and abusive fishing by maritime powers in front of their coasts, which
risked a substantial decrease of their living resources.
Id. See also ATrAD, supra note 2, at 29 ("By agreeing to the inevitable [the United States
and the Soviet Union] hoped to induce other states to act favorably with regard to their main
interest, freedom of navigation.").
69. See Nandan, supra note 2, at 178, 179.
70. See id. at 180-83 "'The reaction of the major fishing nations was to impose obliga-
tions through resource management schemes, rather than to challenge the concept itself." Id.
at 181; Castaneda, supra note 2, at 607, 608.
71. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 608.
72. Id. at 609
73. Nandan, supra note 2, at 183 (citing U.N. GAOR, Sea-Bed Comm., Vol. III, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 107-09, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1970)).
74. Id. at 184.
75. See supra notes 55 to 62 and related discussion.
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sion associated with sovereignty over the territory.76 The intransigence of
these Latin American States in a logically insupportable position gives
grounds to infer that their motivation extended beyond the claimed interest
in protection and use of the marine environment and its natural resources. It
was a vehicle to carry their underlying interest in territorial expansion.77 It
would establish control of an expanded territorial sea by a regime of legal
exclusion, just as the maritime powers sought to use concepts of preferential
fishing rights as their vehicle to preserve access by retaining a regime of le-
gal inclusion. Moreover, any construct that permitted maritime powers to be
present on these seas as a matter of right effectively conceded control of the
seas to those States, at least whenever they cared to be present upon them,78
and so would be unacceptable to these "territorialist" States.
As United Nations negotiations progressed, however, "it became clear
that the territorialist trend would not prosper,"79 at least not through the in-
ternational forum.80 When the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (Conference) held its second session in Caracas in 1974, approxi-
mately 100 of 118 conference participants spoke in favor of an exclusive
economic zone.81 Although the idea of a resource related exclusive economic
zone was by this time not controversial,82 the exact legal nature of the regime
became the subject of intense debate.83 The legal character of the zone would
determine, by implication, whether it would be inclusive in nature, thus po-
tentially committing control of these seas to maritime powers, or exclusive,
thus committing control to coastal States. Maritime powers, therefore,
sought to characterize the zone as part of the high seas. Resource rights
76. Cf VICUNA, supra note 2, at 8 ("Considering this problem in retrospect, the linking
of the discussion on fishing rights to the question of the breadth of the territorial sea appears
to have been an erroneous way of approaching the matter.").
77. See id. at 6 ("[Some Latin American] countries preferred a restrictive approach to
navigation through the zone ... aimed at the safeguarding of their concepts of security or
simply their desire for territorial expansion in marine space.").
78. Cf. Nandan, supra note 2, at 178, 179 ("The developed countries, because of their
advanced technologies, were able to engage in distant water fishing activities wherever and
whenever they chose to do so.").
79. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 608.
80. See Bailey, supra note 2, at 1218 ("[G]randiose 'territorial' claims were made for
domestic consumption, while more modest claims to economic resources were presented for
international scrutiny."). In the late 1960s and early 1970s an "ever-more inflationary trend in
coastal State claims" of 200-mile territorial seas became apparent. Between 1965 and 1979
twelve such claims were made. BROWN, supra note 2, at 124.
81. ATrARD, supra note 2, at 29. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 60-72
(quoting the comments of a number of delegations).
82. BROWN, supra note 2, at 124.
83. ROBERT W. SMITH, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIMs, AN ANALYSIS AND PRIMARY
DOcuMENTS 27 (1986) ("Intense debates arose regarding the characterization of the legal na-
ture of coastal state rights in the EEZ and their relationship to rights of other states in the
zone."); ATTARD, supra note 2, at 39 (quoting A/CONF. 62/WP. 10/Add. 1. at 10) ("[Ihe
question of the EEZ's juridical nature remained 'one of the most controversial issues facing
the Conference."').
14
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would be in the nature of easements in favor of the adjacent coastal State. In
the event of doubt as to whether unassigned or unforeseen rights belonged to
the coastal State or to a foreign user State, the legally inclusive high seas re-
gime would favor the foreign user State. Conversely, developing coastal
States sought to characterize the zone as a territorial sea, with navigational
and related rights granted to foreign user States, again in the nature of an
easement. 84 In the event of dispute or doubt as to particular uses not explic-
itly listed or foreseen (residual rights), the legally exclusive territorial nature
of the zone would result in favor to the coastal State.85
84. Characterization of the debate at the Conference as between coastal states and mari-
time powers is something of an oversimplification engaged in here for ease of discussion of
the EEZ issue. In fact, the issues were more sophisticated and the competing politics and in-
terests significantly more complex. See Table: Competing Groups, Politics, and Interests at
the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, infra, for an illustration. For discussions
of the politics at the Conference, see WANG, supra note 66, at 447-81; HOLuCK, supra note
66; Edward L. Miles, The Structure and Effects of the Decision Process in the Seabed Com-
mittee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 31 INT'L ORG. 159,
162-66 (1977).
85. See generally Castaneda, supra note 2, at 608 ("[B]ig fishing powers persisted in the
need of widening the scope of third States' rights in the exclusive economic zone, as well as
in identifying the zone as part of the high seas. Coastal States objected systematically, espe-
cially the latter attempt .. ); BROWN, supra note 2, at 128, 129; SMrrH, supra note 83, at
27.
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COMPETING GROUPS, POLITICS, AND INTERESTS AT THE THIRD UNITED
NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 8 6
GROUP/ GEOGRAPHIC STATES INCLUDED GOAL/INTERESTS
COUNTRY DESCRIPTION II I
Archipelagic Oce- Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius, Archipelagic waters by
States anic/Island Philippines straight baseline and 200
mile economic zone
Group of 77 Africa, Asia 120 developing nations in International Regime for
and Latin 1980, including Argentina, seabed mining; common
America Brazil, Cuba, Burma, Syria, heritage, production lim-
Thailand, Egypt, Iraq, Iran, its and price control on
Kenya, Malta, Saudi Ara- seabed mining
bia, and others
Japan N/A N/A Opposed to expanded
claims on territorial seas
and fishery zone; access
to deep seabed mining
Landlocked & All regions 48 states, including Revenue sharing; living
Geographi- Czechoslovakia, East Ger- and non-living resource
cally Disad- many, Hungary, Mongolia, exploitation; right to par-
vantaged Poland ticipate in research; 12
States 
--mile territorial sea
Patrimonial- Caribbean & Colombia, Haiti, Jamaica, 200 mile zone over re-
ist & Terri- Latin Ameri- Mexico, Trinidad, Vene- newable resources and/or
torialist can zuela, Chile, Ecuador, 200 mile territorial sea
Peru, Panama
USA N/A N/A Free navigation; guaran-
teed free transit through
straits; free access to
deep seabed mining
Soviet East East Europe Albania, Hungary, Czecho- Seabed mining, 200 mile
European slovakia, Poland, Romania, EEZ; continental shelf;
Bloc Yugoslavia territorial sea; fisheries
I_ transit
Western European EEC and Scandinavians, Coastal jurisdiction over
Europe Community, plus Australia, Austria, fisheries; free access to
(EEC) & plus Scandi- Canada, Ireland, New Zea- deep seabed mining.
Group of 11 navians land
86. This table is copied, with minor modifications, from WANG, supra note 66, at 448
(citing HOLLICK, supra note 66, at 250-56 and Miles, supra note 84, 162-66).
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C. Intense Conference Committee Negotiation and Development
Because of the breadth, scope and complexity of the issues under con-
sideration at the Conference, as well as the sheer number of people in atten-
dance, it had, at its first session, divided itself into three Committees, each
assigned a group of issues to consider.87 EEZ issues, among others relating
to offshore jurisdiction, were assigned to Committee 11.88 In addition, an in-
formal working group of juridical experts, chaired by Minister Jens Evensen
of Norway, was created to consider a number of difficult issues arising in
Committees II and I.8 9 In like manner, Committee II, itself, established a
number of informal consultative groups, each open to participation by all
members of the Committee.90 Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji chaired the
group dealing with the EEZ.9 1 One other negotiating group of significance to
EEZ issues was a private one formed by Ambassadors Castaneda of Mexico
and Vindenes of Norway. 92 Known as the Castaneda-Vindenes group, it con-
sisted of representatives from Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, In-
dia, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Singapore, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States,
and Venezuela. 93 It was in these informal "sub-committees" that the compet-
ing politics and interests of various States and groups of States with respect
to the EEZ and other issues were resolved, and a text prepared for adoption
by the Conference and inclusion in the Convention.94 The various negotiat-
ing positions of States and groups of States that sought expression in these
various working sub-committees were interrelated, overlapping, and some-
times conflicting, but in general, developing coastal States, represented by
the Group of 77, sought greater coastal State control in the EEZ; maritime
powers lined up in opposition 95 The table above provides a schematic sum-
mary of the loose alliances and groups, and of their goals.96
87. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 60. For a thorough discussion of the
preparations for the Conference, see generally MORELL, supra note 16.
88. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 60.
89. See MORELL, supra note 16, at 55; LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 88.
Committee III considered protection of the marine environment and the conduct of scientific
research. Committee I worked on a regime for deep seabed mining. Id. at 51-55.
90. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 88.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 113 n.174.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 88-94.
95. MORELL, supra note 16, at 47-48.
96. At the Second Session, in Caracas in 1974, eight different texts on the EEZ were
submitted by various delegations. One proposal was submitted by a group including Canada,
Chile, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand and Norway. One by Nica-
ragua, one from Nigeria, another from a group including Bulgaria, the Beyelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one by the United States, one by El Salvador,
and one by a group including Gambia, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, the Lib-
269
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In 1975, the Evensen Group developed the regime that became the core
of the EEZ construct ultimately adopted by the Conference.17 This group
proposed a rule in which the exclusive economic zone would be neither terri-
torial sea nor high seas, but a zone "with a new regime in the Law of the
Sea.98 In this sui generis zone, the coastal State owned "sovereign rights" for
exploration, exploitation and conservation of resources, but did not exercise
sovereignty over the sea itself.99 Nevertheless, coastal States perceived this
formulation as a
considerable success ... since it implied the rejection of the thesis de-
fended, up to that [sic] moment, by maritime powers, that is, the recogni-
tion of nothing more than preferential rights to the coastal State for the ex-
ploitation of some resources.... On the other hand, there is no mention of
'rights of sovereignty over the zone,' thus avoiding its assimilation to the
territorial sea.
100
In this scheme there could be no presumption in favor of either coastal
States or maritime States with respect to disputes over residual rights. To
solve this potential dispute problem with the exercise of "concurrent incom-
patible rights within the exclusive economic zone," the Mexican delegation
later suggested a rule for dispute settlement, which ultimately became a part
of the Convention. 1 1
yan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan,
Tunisia, the United Republic of Cameroon, the United Republic of Tanzania, and Zaire. For
the full text of these proposals, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 72-82. These pro-
posals were combined by the Committee Chairman and other officers into a "main trends"
working paper. See id. at 82-87 (text relevant to the EEZ). At the Third Session of the Confer-
ence, at Geneva in 1975, a number of informal papers containing draft articles were submit-
ted, including working papers by the Evenson Group and by the Chairman of the Group of 77.
The Committee Chairman used these papers and proposals to prepare a "Single Negotiating
Text," which became the basis of further negotiation and revision. See id. at 88-91 (full EEZ
text); Id. at 91-93 (full EEZ text of the subsequent "Revised Single Negotiating Text"). See
generally WANG, supra note 66, at 447-81 (discussing the roles played by individual nations
and caucusing groups at the Conference).
97. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 88; Nandan, supra note 2, at 184; Casta-
neda, supra note 2, at 611.
98. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 612 ("[T]he zone was not a territorial sea with exceptions
in favor of third states, nor high seas with exceptions in favor of the coastal State . .
99. Id. at 613.
100. Id. at 613-14.
101. Id. at 615-16. For rights not explicitly attributed by the Convention to either the
coastal state or the maritime state, the following provision would apply:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the
coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict
arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the
conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all relevant
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests in-
volved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
Id. This language became Article 59 of UNCLOS. Id.
18
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Maritime powers disliked this regime. Although it prevented any further
extension of the territorial sea, it sliced away a huge sector of water from the
comfortably and traditionally inclusive high seas. It left them uncertain of
their legal ability to use the seas for military and strategic purposes.10 2 With-
out having to explicitly list their military use rights within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone in the language of the Convention, the maritime powers wanted
to ensure that the new regime would not by definition preclude naval opera-
tions in the zone. 03 In 1977, the Casteneda-Vindenes Group began work to
resolve this problem.'" The work focused on Article 46 of the Revised Sin-
gle Negotiating Text, which stated, in part:
In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked,
enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of the present Convention, the
freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine ca-
bles and pipelines and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related
to navigation and communication. 
105
The maritime powers felt that limiting uses to those "related to naviga-
tion and communication" was too restrictive. The United States representa-
tive, Ambassador Elliot Richardson, proposed this alternative: "Other inter-
nationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those
102. id. at 620-21. "Maritime powers maintained that the meaning and scope of the free-
doms and other uses of the sea enjoyed by all states in the exclusive economic zone were too
restrictive. The United States held that rights of third States had both quantitatively and quali-
tatively diminished." Id. The limits upon other uses of the sea and the due regard provision on
the exercise of the few listed uses appeared to favor coastal States. "Maritime powers consid-
ered that these restrictions, together with the exclusion of the exclusive economic zone from
the definition of high seas, represented a serious threat to their security and military interests."
Id.
103. VICUNA, supra note 2, at 38, 108 (Many delegations preferred not to make any ex-
press statement about the problem of military uses in the exclusive economic zone, but it was
implicitly present behind many of the provisions of the exclusive economic zone.). See also
Nandan, supra note 2, at 186 ("The issue of 'residual rights' not attributed specifically to the
coastal state or to a third state needed to be certified in order to take into account future activi-
ties, such as uses of the sea not yet discovered, or certain strategic uses not yet contemplated
in the convention but traditionally practiced as high seas freedoms."); Castaneda, supra note
2, at 620.
[C]onsensus [on the EEZ] seemed impossible due to the importance attached by
the great powers to the satisfaction of their interests, mainly of a military and stra-
tegic character. Therefore, they insisted on the assimilation of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone to the high seas and on the expansion of third States' rights in the
zone.... The central problem was still the 'residual rights' not attributed specifi-
cally by the Convention either to Coastal States of [sic] to third States. These
rights could refer to future activities, such as uses of the sea not yet discovered or
certain military uses not contemplated in the draft Convention, but traditionally
practiced without any restriction by military powers in the high seas.
Cf. Boczek, supra note 7, at 449 (1988) ("[T]he issue of naval maneuvers was never explicitly
raised by maritime powers.").
104. Nandan, supra note 2, at 186; LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 96.
105. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 92 (emphasis added).
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associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with other provisions of the convention."' 6 Rather
than permitting only uses related to navigation and communication, this new
provision permitted uses related to freedoms of navigation and overflight,
that is, related to freedoms and not just to navigation, arguably a broader set
of uses. It perhaps further broadened the set by citing, as an apparently non-
exclusive example, uses associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and
submarine cables and pipelines.0 7 Customary international law historically
considered military maneuvers a lawful use of the high seas associated with
the operation of warships exercising freedom of navigation." 8 Given this
background, and recognizing that the language was intended to preserve
maritime nations' military use rights in the zone, this language would lead to
the inescapable conclusion that naval operations were to be included in the
set of "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships."'0 9 This would have re-
tained an inclusive regime in the exclusive economic zone, and, therefore,
strategic control for maritime nations.
In exchange for the broader Richardson use provision, however, coastal
States extracted several provisions that were intended to "re-establish the
balance."" 0 Most important were provisions that unambiguously established
the exclusive economic zone as neither part of the territorial sea nor part of
106. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 622.
107. See VICUNA, supra note 2, at 29 (emphasis added).
Although the actual formula broadens the subjects referred to by other uses, it is
not as far reaching as desired by some maritime powers, who sought an uncondi-
tional reference to other legal uses of the sea. This provision is directly related to
the discussion on the military uses of the exclusive economic zone.
Casteneda, supra note 2, at 615, 622.
108. See Edward D. Brown, Freedom of the Sea Versus the Common Heritage of Man-
kind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 521, 533 (1983).
[F]reedom of use of the high seas.. . was described by Professor Schwarzenberger
in his Hague Lectures in 1955: 'Under international customary law, the right of use
of the high seas, the air space above them and the seabed may be exercised for any
purposes not expressly prohibited by international law as, for instance, for sea and
air navigation, fishing, laying of cables and pipelines, naval exercises and wartime
operations.
(quoting Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
RECuLEm DES CouRs 195, 360 (1955) (emphasis added). See also ATrARD, supra note 2, at 86.
Before the Conference, it was generally accepted that freedoms of movement and
communication included activities that were ancillary to said freedoms. Thus not
only was freedom of navigation of warships recognized, but so were other related
activities such as the holding of military exercises. There is no evidence that this
position under customary law has changed.
Id.
109. Alan V. Lowe, Rejoinder, 11 MARINEPOL'Y 250, 251 (1987).
110. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 622.
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the high seas."' This was important because the Richardson proviso did not
say internationally lawful uses of the high seas exist in the EEZ. As dis-
cussed above, this can be argued to include military operations. It said lawful
uses of the sea, and the sea in question, under this balanced regime, was not
the high seas, bat a sui generis belt of water called the exclusive economic
zone.112 The proper question then, would not be whether military operations
are internationally lawful uses of the high seas, which customary interna-
tional law answers in the affirmative; it would be whether military opera-
tions are lawful uses of the exclusive economic zone.
This left the important question of residual rights in the air. If the EEZ
were to be considered fundamentally coastal waters to which some rights
were reserved for other States, then any rights unassigned, or residual, might
well be considered as belonging to coastal States. Thus, in any dispute, the
presumption might be in favor of the coastal State. Conversely, if the EEZ
were considered as essentially high seas, with a certain described set of
rights and jurisdictions assigned to the coastal State, then any rights not ex-
plicitly assigned to the coastal State might belong to all States, as part of the
pre-existing residual rights associated with freedoms of navigation on, in and
over the high seas, out of which the EEZ had been carved. Military activi-
ties, permissible in the high seas, would have been included in that set of re-
sidual rights. As agreed upon, however, with residual rights unassigned and
the issue left in the balance, and with each side required to exercise its rights
in the EEZ with due regard for the rights of the other, the regime appeared
ambiguous. These provisions left any undefined rights unassigned, and gave
no hint as to how to weigh the balance in settling any dispute over such as-
signment. Moreover, these provisions, while requiring "due regard," did not
define just what regard is due, leaving that difficult and dangerous question
on the table, with the answer very much dependent upon the eye of the be-
holder.
111. Id. ("This... meant a considerable success for the Coastal States Group. Id. at
621. Article 55 established the exclusive economic zone as a new regime not part of the terri-
torial sea, while Article 86 established, conversely, that the exclusive economic zone was
likewise not a part of the high seas. UNCLOS art. 55 states:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights
and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are
governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
UNCLOS art. 86 states:
The provisions of this Part [covering the high seas] apply to all parts of the sea
that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.
This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States
in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with article 58.
Id. (emphasis added).
112. See generally VICUJA, supra note 2, at 16-90.
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D. Ambiguity
Perhaps in an effort to resolve this question, the phrase "referred to in
article 87" was inserted into the phrase "freedoms of navigation and over-
flight," so that what became Article 58 of the Convention now says, "free-
doms referred to in Article 87 of navigation and over-flight."'" 3 The free-
doms referred to in Article 87 include high seas freedoms of navigation and
overflight.114 Internationally lawful uses of the sea related to high seas free-
doms of navigation and overflight historically included military operations,
as discussed above." 5 The vast weight of authority confirms that this is the
113. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 97.
114. Article 87, Freedom of the High Seas, states:
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of
the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and
by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under
international law, subject to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due
regard for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.
Id.
115. See BARBARA KwIATKOwsKA, THE 200 MLE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN THE
NEw LAW OF THE SEA 198-235 (1989); Barbara Kwiatkowska, Military Uses in the EEZ-a
reply, 11 MARINE POL'Y 249 (1987) [hereinafter Kwiatkowska-Military Uses].; Boczek, supra
note 7, at 450; ATTARD, supra note 2, at 63 ("[T]he drafters intended to equate the quality of
[the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone] with those en-
joyed under Article 87 on the high seas."; "This vague proviso is intended to facilitate the
freedoms of navigation and communication particularly where naval maneuvers are in-
volved." Id. at 74); VICUJNA, supra note 2, at 28 ("[T]his reference to Article 87 was intro-
duced in 1977 with the express intention of identifying the freedoms that all States enjoy in
the exclusive economic zone with the same freedoms that they enjoy in the high seas ... ").
But see Lowe, supra note 109, at 250-51 ("[W]e differ only in our assessment of how well
[the understanding that military activities are permitted in the EEZ] was translated into a con-
vention provision.").
UNCLOS art. 58, Rights and Duties of Other States in the Exclusive Economic Zone,
states:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, en-
joy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to
in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables
22
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proper interpretation.116 For dissenters, however, Article 58 also has the ef-
fect of reserving the exclusive economic zone for peaceful purposes. Article
58 states, in part, that "Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of interna-
tional law apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not in-
compatible with this Part." ' 7 Article 88 of the Convention states: 'The high
seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." '118 Thus, the interplay of these
two Articles reserves the exclusive economic zone, like the high seas, for
peaceful purposes. The question then becomes: Does the reservation of the
sui genris exclusive economic zone for peaceful purposes prohibit previ-
ously lawful naval maneuvers and operations in these waters? As to this
question, the Convention is silent. Some suggest that this may re-inject the
ambiguity Richardson's language 1 9 sought to remove.120
Although it is clear that maritime powers intended-and some say it
was the "general understanding" of the Convention-to permit, as a matter
of right, military uses in the exclusive economic zone,121 some coastal States
persistently objected to that view. Brazil, for example, like the United States,
was part of the Casteneda-Vindenes Group. 122 In a declaration made upon
and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the ex-
clusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in
the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties
of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules
of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
Id.
116. See, e.g., infra note 133.
117. UNCLOS art. 58.
118. Id. art. 88.
119. Castaneda, supra note 2, at 622 ("Other internationally lawful uses of the sea related
to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft ... and com-
patible with other provisions of the convention.").
120. See ATTARD, supra note 2, at 66 ("The drafters of the UNCLOS III EEZ regime
have created a delicate, intricate, and sometimes ambiguous mechanism .. "); BOOTH, supra
note 2, at 80-81("[A] creative ambiguity would have arisen because of this sui generis charac-
ter of the EEZ."); Boczek, supra note 7, at 451 ("The wording of article 58, however, is am-
biguous enough for the promoters of coastal state jurisdiction to claim... that certain foreign
military activities in their respective economic zones could not be accommodated under arti-
cle 58 as internationally 'lawful uses of the sea..."); Michele Wallace, The Right of Warships
to Operate in the Exclusive Economic Zone as Perceived by Delegates to the Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention, in INTERNATIONAL NAVIGATION: ROCKS AND SHOALS
ArmA? 345, 345 (Jon M. Van Dyke et al. eds, 1988) ("The resolution of this conflict in the
text of the Convention is to a large extent ambiguous.").
121. Wallace, supra note 120, at 345 (citing Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh of Singa-
pore, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
CONVENTION 303-04 (John M. Van Dyke ed., 1985)).
122. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 113 n.174. The group included Australia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Egypt, India, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Singapore,
the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United States,
23
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signing the Convention, Brazil insisted that "the provisions of the conven-
tion do not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or manoeu-
vres within the exclusive economic zone, particularly when these activities
involve the use of weapons or explosives, without the prior knowledge and
consent of the coastal State. ' 123 Recent Brazilian domestic law implements
this view. I24 Although this is best understood as the fading cry of a lone dis-
senter, carried away by the current but refusing submission to the inevitable,
this objection, along with those of Uruguay and Cape Verde, is sometimes
cited as evidence of ambiguity concerning the legal status of military opera-
tions in the exclusive economic zone. 25 Furthermore, these dissenters can
argue that the issue of military uses was never formally discussed at the Con-
ference, despite efforts of a number of countries to bring it to the surface.
126
Indeed, it was the United States which foreclosed explicit discussions on
"[a]ny specific limitation on military activities," arguing that "such a com-
plex task could quickly bring to an end current efforts to negotiate a law of
the sea convention."1 27 While contending that the term "peaceful pur-
poses' 121 did not preclude military activities generally, the United States
suggested "[limitations] on military activities would require the negotiation
of a detailed arms control agreement." 29 The apparent exclusion of the sub-
ject from formal negotiations, combined with the "remarkable"' 30 silence of
the Convention "on legal questions connected with military uses"'' (a si-
lence that might logically follow from exclusion of the subject in negotia-
and Venezuela.
123. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 23, at 102.
124. Law No. 8617 of 4 January 1993, On the Territorial Sea, The Contiguous Zone, The
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, reprinted in U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN
AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OFTHE SEA, U.N. LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No. 23 at 17, 19 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Lowe, supra note 109, at 251. See also Wallace, supra note 120, at 346-
48; Boczek, supra note 7, at 451; Lowe, supra note 11, at 179; ATrARD, supra note 2, at 68;
BROWN, supra note 2, at 171-72.
126. See generally Wallace, supra note 120 (discussing proposals to limit the uses of the
seas to peaceful purposes by Egypt, Bulgaria, the Congo, Bangladesh, Peru, Brazil, Albania,
the Khmer Republic, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal,
Senegal, Somalia, Uruguay, and China). See also VICUNA, supra note 2, at 108.
127. Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space: Zones of Peace and Security (Continued), 5 THmRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS, 4th Sess., 67th
Mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.57-70, U.N. Sales No. E.76.V.8 (1976) (Comments of
U.S. Delegate, T. Vincent Learson in a plenary session) [hereinafter 5 OFFICIAL RECORDSI.
128. UNCLOS art. 88 states: "The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes."
The United States view was that this did not prohibit previously lawful naval maneuvers and
operations in these waters. Wallace, supra note 120, at 347. "The term 'peaceful purposes'
did not, of course, preclude military activities generally. The United States had consistently
held that the conduct of military activities for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the
Charter of the United Nations and with principles of international law." 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 127, at 62. (comments of U.S. Delegate, T. Vincent Learson in a plenary session).
129. 5 OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 127, at 62; VICUNA, supra note 2, at 108 n.61.
130. ATrARD, supra note 2, at 68.
131. Id.
24
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/4
2002] MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 277
tions), render suspect, to some, the conclusion that military uses were in-
tended to be permitted under the Convention regime. 3 2 This slippery issue
has generated something of an undercurrent of academic discussion over the
question of just precisely what military uses, if any, are permitted in the zone
by right.'33
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea completed
its work in 1982, and the Convention opened for signature on December
10th of that year. 134 It was signed by 117 nations.135 In terms of the battle for
132. Cf. BROWN, supra note 2, at 177 (discussing the Casteneda-Vintendes Group nego-
tiations, and dismissing the "anecdotal evidence" of their general understanding as "hardly
qualifying as travaux preparatoires."). Compare BOOTH, supra note 2, at 80-81("[T]he si-
lence of the document on military matters hides a number of rights for navies, such as the
right to deploy weapons, to conduct naval exercises and to hold weapons tests within the
EEZs of other states."), with WANG, supra note 66, at 370 ("The issue of military uses of the
ocean has been neglected at the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences.").
133. See, e.g., Boubonnier & Haeck, supra note 13, at 958 ("Concerning Article 33, an
interpretive polemic arises over possible restrictions to military exercise, and possibly military
training overflights, occurring over the exclusive economic zone." Id. at 958. " [A] contro-
versy exists in the interpretation of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea pertaining to
the legitimacy of aerial military maneuvers over the exclusive economic zone, which could be
an exception to the freedom of overflight edict with Article 3 of the Chicago Convention." Id.
at 896 n.40.); ATTARD, supra note 2, at 67-69, 85 ("[Tlhe proviso.., is intended to facilitate
military navigation and overflight. However, this vague proviso is bound to lead to prob-
lems."); VICUNA, supra note 2, at 112-20; BROWN, supra note 2, at 171, 173-89 ("Opinions
differ as to whether such military use of the EEZ is a freedom or lawful use attributed to other
States in Article 58 of the UN Convention or an unattributed or residual use under Article
59."); Kwiatkowska-Military Uses, supra note 115, at 250 (The Casteneda-Vintendes Group
compromises "were accepted and subsequently incorporated ... as sufficiently evidencing
that the navigational and other communications freedoms, including the related military uses,
remained-despite the sui generis character of the EEZ-to be governed by the freedom of
the high seas.., in view of the legislative history... military uses associated with the opera-
tion of ships and aircraft such as naval maneuvers are clearly the 'internationally lawful uses'
of the sea governed by freedom of navigation and overflight." Id.); Lowe, supra note 109, at
250 ("[I] share [Kwiatkowska's] view of the general understanding in UNCLOS III that mili-
tary activities in the EEZ be permitted .. "); BOOTH, supra note 2, at 80-81; Meyer, supra
note 11; Rose, supra note 11; Boczek, supra note 7; Lowe, supra note 11. See also Dale G.
Stephens, The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on the Conduct of Peacetime
Naval/Military Operations, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 283,290-91 (1999).
Unlike some States, western nations generally recognize that foreign naval vessels
may transit through this zone in the "normal mode" and may even conduct military
exercises within a foreign State's EEZ, bound only by the obligation to have "due
regard" to the legitimate resource rights of the coastal State and, of course, other
State users. Such an interpretation is mildly contentious, given the requirement for
"peaceful uses" of this zone mandated by Article 58 of the LOSC, though it is
quite ambitious to conclude, as some publicists do, that reference to 'peaceful
uses' of the high seas within Article 88 of the Convention necessarily prohibits all
naval/military activity within international waters. Such an interpretation is cer-
tainly not a preferred one adopted by more measured considerations.
Id. (citations omitted).
134. Bernardo Zuleta, Introduction to THE LAW OF THE SEA: UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: WITH INDEX AND FINAL ACT OF THE THIRD UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA at xix, xxiv, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983).
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use of the seas for military and strategic purposes, the maritime powers ob-
tained in the Convention, at best, a draw-perhaps stalemate or standoff bet-
ter describes the situation, since the forces had not left the field. The history
of the battle for control through the signing of the Convention in 1982 is
reminiscent of the opening stages of World War I: a series of flanking
movements ending in stalemate and stand off when the opposing forces ran
out of room to maneuver. Developing coastal States attacked with extended
sovereignty, but were outflanked by maritime powers' preferential fishing
rights proposals. Developing coastal States wheeled to the flank once again,
attacking with sovereign rights and jurisdiction in a sui generis natural re-
sources zone, only to find themselves facing maritime powers armed with a
regime of high seas freedoms. Again moving to a flank attack, developing
coastal States proposed limits under the peaceful purposes provisions, but
maritime powers again fought them off. Unable to maneuver further, both
sides declared victory and rested, staring thoughtfully across no man's land
at an undefeated foe, each considering other ways to continue the battle.
What can be said about the nature of this stand off? The Convention es-
tablished a regime in the EEZ that is neither totally inclusive, nor totally ex-
clusive. Coastal States did not gain control as a matter of sovereignty, but
did gain certain sovereign rights and some jurisdiction to regulate activities
in their EEZ. These coastal State preferences are justified primarily by con-
cerns for ecological and environmental preservation. Maritime nations must
condition their activities in foreign EEZs upon due regard for these coastal
State preferences. Articles 55 and 86 of the Convention establish that the ex-
clusive economic zone is unique, neither part of the territorial sea nor part of
the high seas.136 Articles 56 and 58, however, create a balance between the
rights of coastal States and those of foreign maritime States.
Article 56 awards coastal States "sovereign rights" to manage and con-
serve the natural resources in the zone, and "with regard to other activities
for [the zone's] economic exploitation and exploration." The article also as-
signs coastal States "jurisdiction" with regard to artificial islands, installa-
tions and structures, marine scientific research, and the preservation of the
marine environment.137 These competencies, however, do not grant sover-
eignty over the zone itself,138 nor are they absolutely exclusive. 139 The "sov-
135. Id.
136. In describing the high seas, UNCLOS art. 86 excludes the exclusive economic zone
from the high seas, stating, "The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are
not included in the exclusive economic zone. .. ." UNCLOS art. 55 excludes the exclusive
economic zone from the territorial sea by stating, "The exclusive economic zone is an area
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime ... " Id.
137. UNCLOS art. 56.
138. UNCLOS art. 58(2) states: "Articles 88 to 115 ... apply to the [EEZ] in so far as
they are not incompatible with this part." Therefore, Article 89 applies to the EEZ. Article 89
states, "Invalidity of claims of sovereignty over the high seas-No State may validly purport
to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty." Thus, no State may subject any part of
the EEZ to its sovereignty.
26
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ereign rights" are limited in many cases by a duty to share with other
States." "Jurisdiction" is provided for in-and limited by-related provi-
sions of the Convention.1 4' Moreover, "in exercising its rights and perform-
ing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and
shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention." 4 2
For maritime States seeking presence in and use of the EEZ, Article 58
explicitly preserves the freedom of navigation and overflight and of the lay-
ing of submarine cables and pipelines, and "other internationally lawful uses
of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the opera-
tion of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines. ..- 14' Like coastal
States' sovereign rights and jurisdiction, however, these rights must be exer-
cised with "due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State,"' " and
foreign maritime States "shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted
by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and
other rules of international law in so far as they are not incompatible with
[Part V of the Convention]."' 45
The ability of maritime powers to engage in naval activities is therefore
not unqualified. The effect upon coastal State claims and interests-that is,
upon natural resources and the environment-must be considered before de-
ciding upon the nature and scope of a naval operation in a foreign EEZ.
Thus, absence of legal challenge to naval activities is by no means assured.
Whether and to what extent unilateral naval operations in a foreign EEZ are
permitted by the Convention remains a subject of academic discussion, and
in some cases, affected by domestic law claims of coastal States that reflect
differing interpretations of the Convention's meaning.'46
139. BROWN, supra note 2, at 131, 181; ATrARD, supra note 2, at 47-50; VICUNA, supra
note 2, at 43-48.
140. BROWN, supra note 2, at 131, 181; ATTARD, supra note 2, at 47-50.
141. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 182 (arguing that "to describe the zone as exclusive" is
not accurate in relation to the jurisdiction granted coastal states by Article 56); AT-rArD, supra
note 2, at 48-50. UNCLOS Art. 56 states, in pertinent part, "[J]urisdiction as provided for in
the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment...
Id.
142. UNCLOS art. 56.
143. Id.
144. Id. art. 58
145. Id.
146. For discussions of the variations among coastal state EEZ claims, see Hugo
Caminos, Harmonization of Pre-Existing 200-Mile Claims in the Latin American Region with
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its Exclusive Economic Zone, 30 U.
MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REv. 9 (1998); Nadelson, supra note 7, at 464-65; Barbara Kwiat-
kowska, Creeping Jurisdiction Beyond 200 Miles in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea
27
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It is fair to say that the Convention's guidance on the question of mili-
tary activities in EEZs is less than definitive. It is as true today is it was
when the words were written, that "even when the Convention enters into
effect, its gaps and ambiguities will not prevent conflicts between coastal
and other states regarding the rights to military uses in the EEZ."'147
IV. THE UNITED STATES' VIEW
Paying this academic discussion no more mind than it pays proponents
of the minority dissenting view, the United States has stated that the custom-
ary international law of the sea, as codified in the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion, is clear on the issue of military activities in EEZs. The United States
has not yet ratified the Convention, which entered into force on November
16, 1994,148 but takes the view that, except for provisions concerning deep
seabed mining, it accurately states customary international law. 49 The
United States interpretation of the Convention is this:
[A]ll States continue to enjoy in the [EEZ] traditional high seas freedoms
of navigation and overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those free-
doms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those
freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations, exer-
cises and activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful
uses of the sea. The right to conduct such activities will continue to be en-
joyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone.150
Quite naturally, the United States Navy adopts this position in The
Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,'51 which provides
Convention and State Practice, 22 OCEAN DEV & INT'L L. 153 (1991); and Francisco 0. Vi-
cuna, State Practice and National Legislation Relating to the Exclusive Economic Zone, the
Continental Shelf and Straits Used for International Navigation: Basic Trends, in LAW OF THE
SEA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CONTINUING SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED REGIME
350, 359 (Rudiger Wolfrum, ed., 1990) ("Military uses of the exclusive economic zone repre-
sent one of the discrepant interpretations.").
147. Boczek, supra note 7, at 458.
148. Under UNCLOS Art. 308, the convention "shall enter into force 12 months after the
date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification or accession." As of November 16,
1993, the 60th ratification or accession was deposited with the Secretary General. U.N.
DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, U.N. LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No.
24 at 1 (1993).
149. See U.S. Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY
Comp. PREs. DOC. 384 (1983).
150. Warren Christopher, United States of America Statement in Right of Reply (Mar. 8,
1983) 17 THIRD CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 244, U.N. Sales
No. E.83.V.3 (1984) reprinted in ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (NWP 1-14M/MCWP5-2.1/COMDTPUB 5800.1) at 1-
25, 1-27 to 1-28 (1997) [hereinafter ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT].
151. THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NWP 9/FMFM
(Rev. A 1989), reprinted in 64 INT'L LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 385, 411
(Horace B. Robertson ed., 1991). For an updated and annotated version of the COMMANDERS
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operational guidance to its personnel. It is therefore consistent for readers to
view The Commander's Handbook as containing "an exposition of the
United States' view of international law."'152 The Commander's Handbook
states that "[W]arships and military aircraft enjoy the high seas freedoms of
navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the sea re-
lated to those freedoms, in and over [the EEZ].... 153 It further states that
"[Tihe existence of an exclusive economic zone in an area of naval opera-
tions need not, of itself, be of operational concern to the naval com-
mander."' 54 Although called, in general, "resoundingly successful in explain-
ing the intricacies of the law,"'l 5 The Commander's Handbook has been
criticized as containing "controversial pronouncements" regarding certain
unsettled areas.'56 The EEZ is one such area. As has been discussed, the
problem of naval activities in the EEZ is somewhat more contentious than
The Commander's Handbook might lead one to believe.' 57 On both the stra-
tegic and operational level, the existence of an EEZ should be a matter of
conscious concern and careful consideration for the naval commander, just
as should the possibility of coastal State objection to naval activities within
it.158
Some commentators opine that the Convention explicitly limits warship
operation in the EEZ by the obligation to have due regard to the rights and
duties of the coastal State.'59 In its EEZ, the coastal State has certain "sover-
eign rights" with respect to natural resources, and "jurisdiction" over the es-
tablishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures, over
marine scientific research, and over the protection and preservation of the
HANDBOOK, see ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150.
152. Alan V. Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations and
the Contemporary Law of the Sea in 64 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS 109, 109 (Horace B. Robertson ed., 1991).
153. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at 2-20, § 2.4.2.
154. Id.
155. Lowe, supra note 152, at 109.
156. Id. Cf Bernard H. Oxman, International Law and Naval and Air Operations at Sea,
in 64 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES: THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 19, 34 (Horace B. Rob-
ertson ed., 1991).
157. See Lowe, supra note 152, at 112-13. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at
2-20, § 2.4.2 n.58 (explaining that "A few nations explicitly claim the right to regulate the
navigation of foreign vessels in their EEZ beyond that authorized by customary international
law reflected in the LOS Convention: Brazil, Guyana, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria,
Pakistan, and the Seychelles.... The United States rejects those claims.").
158. Warship operation in a foreign EEZ is, at a minimum, subject to the following rules:
"(1) Refrain from the unlawful threat or use of force; (2) exercise due regard for the rights of
other nations to use the sea; (3) exercise due regard for the rights of the coastal state in the
EEZ; and (4) observe the rules of international law and obligations under other treaties."
Meyer, supra note 11, at 244 (citing Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 837-38 (1984)).
159. See UNCLOS art. 56; Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 809, 837-38 (1984);
Boczek, supra note 7, at 450.
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marine environment."W These provisions might preclude naval activities that
potentially interfere with or harm these coastal State interests. 16  A fre-
quently cited example is that of a weapons exercise, test or placement, such
as the use of mines, that might potentially harm a natural resource. 162 Dis-
cussion, likewise, obscures the issue of emplacement of military devices,
such as detection devices, in the EEZ.163 It is unsurprising then, to find that
the United States view of the law is not universally accepted. Uruguay, for
example, takes the position that the Convention does not explicitly permit
the same range of uses associated with warship operation in the EEZ as are
permitted on the high seas.16' Brazil has enacted domestic legislation that
states: "In the exclusive economic zone, military maneouvres, in particular
those involving the use of weapons or explosives, may only be carried out by
other States with the consent of the Brazilian Government."' 6 By legislation
160. UNCLOS art. 56.
161. Oxman, supra note 65, at 838-43; Boczek, supra note 7, at 450-54; J. Ashley
Roach, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of the Century,
94 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 67 (2000) ("[I]ntemational recognition of the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) and the continental shelf now requires belligerents to have due regard for the rights of
coastal states in those zones when conducting hostilities in sea areas between the territorial
sea and the high seas and on the continental shelf."); SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA 14 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995).
162. See, e.g., John Astley & Michael N. Schmitt, The Law of the Sea and Naval Opera-
tions, 42 A.F. L. REv. 119, 137 (1997) ("[W]hile a naval exercise permissible in the EEZ, it
must not significantly interfere with coastal state fishing activities in the area."); Oxman, su-
pra note 65, at 838; Lowe, supra note 152, at 113; Boczek, supra note 7, at 451; SAN REmO
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA, supra note 153,
at 108.
If a belligerent considers it necessary to lay mines in the exclusive economic
zone ... of a neutral state, the belligerent... shall avoid so far as practicable inter-
ference with the exploration or exploitation of the zone by the neutral state. Due
regard shall also be given to the protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment.
Id.
163. See Boczek, supra note 7, at 452-55, 458; Lowe, supra note 11, at 179 n.27 (citing
Tullio Treves, Military Installations, Structures and Devices on the Seabed, 74 AM J. INT'L L.
808 (1981)).
164. Lowe, supra note 152, at 113 n.22 (citing Letter from the Ambassador of the Orien-
tal Republic of Uruguay, London, August 18, 1987). Under Uruguay's view, rights to conduct
military operations in the EEZ are not awarded to either the foreign state or to the coastal
state. They are residual rights, and conflicts over their exercise must be resolved per Article
59 of the Convention, "on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances,
taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as
to the international community as a whole." UNCLOS art. 59. Such conflict resolution might
well favor the coastal state. See generally Lowe, supra note 152, at 179; Barbara Kwiat-
kowska-Military Uses, supra note 115, at 249; Lowe, supra note 109, at 251.
165. Law No. 8617 of 4 January 1993, On the Territorial Sea, The Contiguous Zone, The
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN
No. 23, supra note 124, at 17, 19 (1993). The Brazilian position, as well as that of Uruguay,
are distinctly minority views, and have been rejected by most states and by "the overwhelm-
ing majority of commentators." Lowe, supra note 152, at 114. See also BROWN, supra note 2,
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enacted on May 2, 1993, Iran flatly prohibited "foreign military activities
and practices" within its EEZ. 66 Similarly, India, Malaysia, and Pakistan
have all made claims that would restrict naval activities in their EEZs with-
out prior permission. 67 Although the Convention may express a general rule
with respect to the existence of the basic EEZ concept in customary interna-
tional law, some believe "it cannot be considered that the exact scope of the
rights that a State can exercise in the exclusive economic zone is an issue
settled in international law."1 68 Moreover, the Convention is not the last and
final word on the customary law of the sea in this area. The years since its
completion have seen significant coastal State domestic legislation, a prac-
tice that demonstrates the importance of the EEZ to these nations.
Measures to protect the marine environment raise an additional potential
basis for efforts to limit naval activities in coastal waters. Although the Con-
vention immunizes warships from the provisions of its environmental pres-
ervation and pollution control regime, 69 concern over nuclear contamination
may nevertheless provide a basis for some coastal States to attempt to re-
strict the operation of some warships. One commentator predicted in 1983,
"The passage of 'potential polluters,' such as nuclear-powered vessels, ves-
sels carrying nuclear or other 'hazardous' cargoes, and ammunition ships,
through the EEZs of some coastal States may in time be jeopardized, treaty
or no treaty.' 170 Another has stated that the Convention may justify a coastal
State in "prohibiting a military activity which caused ecological harm.'
17 1
Giving a ring of truth to these prophesies-perhaps only distant and faint,
but nevertheless distinctly audible-Malta, in its 1993 declaration made
upon ratification of the Convention, stated:
Malta is of the view that the sovereign immunity contemplated in [the
Convention] Article 236 does not exonerate a State from such obligation,
moral or otherwise, in accepting responsibility and liability for compensa-
tion and relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the marine en-
vironment by any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned
or operated by the State and used on government non-commercial ser-
vice.
172
at 175 ("Brazil's understanding of the Convention is unsound in so far as it requires the
coastal State's consent for the conduct of military exercises or manoeuvres.").
166. Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and
Oman Sea (May 2, 1993), reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No. 24, supra note 148, at
10-15.
167. MARrrIME CLAIMS REFERENCE IVIANUAL, supra note 12.
168. VICUNA, supra note 2, at 244 (citing Jonathan I. Charney, The Exclusive Economic
Zone and Public International Law, 15 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 233, 239 (1985)).
169. UNCLOS art. 236.
170. Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Prospect, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561, 586 (1983).
171. ATTARD, supra note 2, at 68 (citing Arthur H. Westing, Military Impact on Ocean
Ecology, 1 OCEAN YEARBOOK 436 (1978)).
172. Declaration of Malta upon Ratification, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No.
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Malta's declaration indicates a conviction that its national interest in en-
vironmental protection conditions a foreign State's interest in navigating in
Maltese coastal waters, thus potentially restricting foreign warship opera-
tions.
Chile has gone even farther, declaring a legal interest in the high seas
adjacent to its EEZ, calling these waters a "presential sea. 17 3 In this regime,
Chile asserts three special interests in a vast area of the high seas beyond the
EEZ.1'7 4 These special interests are driven by a concern for environmental
protection of its coastal seas, which, Chile believes, requires its involvement
in management of the marine ecosystem beyond its EEZ.'75 The three special
interests include "first, the participation in and surveillance of the activities
undertaken by other States in the high seas areas of interest.... 176 This
would not exclude other States, but would require Chilean inclusion in for-
eign State activities. 17 7 Second, an interest in economic activities in the pre-
sential sea, to promote national economic development, and to ensure that
foreign State activities do not harm Chilean development.178 This could have
jurisdictional implications, as it could provide a justification for Chilean
regulatory efforts in regards to conservation of fisheries.'79 As noted above
with respect to the EEZ, this also might inhibit weapons testing that poten-
tially damage living natural resources. Third, establishment of the presential
sea has a national security motivation-"not in a strict military sense but in
terms of protection of the national interest, including the economic dimen-
sion ... with particular reference to the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
territorial sea.'
180
The idea is that, to protect natural resources in its EEZ, Chile must pre-
vent damage to natural resources in the bordering high seas, in order to avoid
a spillover effect. As a part of this effort, the presential sea concept mandates
Chilean inclusion, and therefore implies Chilean involvement in all foreign
23, supra note 124, at 7.
173. Francisco 0. Vicuna, Toward an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and
the Settlement of Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea, 24 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 81
(1993)[hereinafter Vicuna, Presential Sea] (citing Jorge Martinez Busch, La gran tarea de
esta generacion es la ocupacion efectiva de nuestra mar (Clase Magistral dictada por el Co-
mandante en Jefe de la Armada de Chile, Valparaiso, May 4, 1990) and Chile, Law No.
19.079, Official Journal, Sept. 6, 1991).
174. Chile's presential sea includes 19,967,337 square kilometers, extending from the
western edge of the continental shelf of Easter Island to the South Pole. Thomas A. Klingan,
Jr., Mar Presencial (The Presential Sea): Deja Vu All Over Again?-A Response to Francisco
Orrego Vicuna, 24 OcEAN DEV & INT'L L. 93 at 94 (1993) (" [Ilt constitutes one of the largest
areas of hegemony in existence."). Admittedly, Chile's assertion is not accepted by the larger
international community.
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nation naval maneuvers in these waters. Exclusion of foreign navies is not
necessarily required, but the requirement of Chilean inclusion may, as a
practical matter, have that effect. It is not difficult to imagine circumstances
in which the United States Navy, for example, might wish to conduct naval
exercises without foreign nation inclusion or observation. Under the Chilean
regime, were it to be accepted and affirmatively enforced, a large area of the
Southern Pacific might be eliminated from use for those purposes. Chile's
presential sea, based in principle upon concerns for environmental protec-
tion, potentially imposes conditions and limits on foreign warship operation
in the claimed area.
Since the Conference closed in 1982, the Convention's general EEZ
concept-that coastal States are entitled to claim and exercise sovereign
rights over natural resources in and under the sea within 200 miles of their
coast-has become accepted as part of customary international law,' 81 but
without clarification of the specific problem of naval operations discussed
above. International tribunals, including the International Court of Justice,
and United States domestic courts, have provided little guidance, although
acknowledging the existence of the EEZ in international law in a general
sense. 82 State declaratory practice is equally nondispositive, although as of
June 1993, 89 of 143 coastal States claimed 200 mile EEZs.183 Although
these domestic claims follow the Convention's EEZ regime as a basic guide-
line, they contain significant differences in specific implementation. 184 n the
words of Orrego Vicuna, "IT]he detailed mechanisms of the Convention in
reference to the exclusive economic zone, unlike its concept and basic ele-
ments, would not have been incorporated into customary international law,
since they do not have sufficient support in national practice and legisla-
tion." '185 National practice and legislation is varied and inconsistent in the
implementation of the detailed EEZ mechanisms, and so does not provide a
rule for naval operations. State declaratory practice, while not providing a
181. Caminos, supra note 10, at 17; Boczek, supra note 7, at 458; BROWN, supra note 2,
at 141, 182; VICUNA, supra note 2, at 246, 256; ATrARD, supra note 2, at 308; SMrrH, supra
note 83, at 30; BUREAU OF OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT.
OF STATE, LIITS IN THE SEAS No. 112, UNrrED STATES RESPONSE TO EXCESSIVE NATIONAL
MARITIME CLAIMs 37 (1992) [hereinafter LIMITS IN THE SEAS No. 112].
182. International cases include Continental Shelf Tunisia Libya Judgment (Tunisia v.
Libyan Arab Jamahiriva) 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in the
Gulf of Maine (Canada v. U.S.) 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriva v. Malta) 1985 I.C.J. 13 (Jun. 3); Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning De-
limitation of the Maritime Boundary, 25 I.L.M. 251 (1986). For a general discussion of these
cases as they relate to the development of the EEZ in customary international law, see
ATrARD, supra note 2, at 301-03. The U.S. cases include Koru North America v. United
States, 701 F. Supp. 229, 232 n.6 (1988) and United States v. Rioseco, 845 F.2d 299, 301 n.1
(1988).
183. LAW OFTRE SEA BULLETIN No. 23, supra note 124, at 79.
184. See VICUNA, supra note 2, at 143-54; ATTARD, supra note 2, at 49-54; BROWN, su-
pra note 2, at 143-45, 163-68.
185. VICUNA, supra note 2, at 246.
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rule of law, does reflect a common theme-and the theme hints that unilat-
eral foreign naval activities in a coastal State's EEZ will, in an increasing
number of cases, be viewed with disfavor. Coastal States are waging the bat-
tle for control of their coastal waters outside of the language of the Conven-
tion, using domestic regulation to extend their ability to exclude other States
from these waters.
State declaratory practice reflects a continuing effort by coastal States to
retain control of coastal waters by legal exclusion-whether by claims of
sovereignty, or extensive regulatory jurisdiction, or some combination
amounting to quasi-sovereignty. 8 6 Robert Nadelson, in a 1992 analysis of
differences between State EEZ claims and the Convention, divided coastal
State claims into four analytical categories: territorial, jurisdictional, func-
tional, and extra-legal differences from the Convention.'87 These categories
reflect different means to obtain similar ends; the legislation in each category
manifests the coastal State's effort to control its EEZ by excluding others to
the extent deemed necessary to its national interests, however defined. 8
In the territorial category, the most obvious examples of the coastal
State desire for extended exclusion and control are the eleven current claims
of 200-mile territorial seas.' 89 Other States, however, expand territorial con-
trol by reserving a right to create designated areas and limit freedom of navi-
186. See Nadelson, supra note 7, at 486-87; LEwis M. ALEXANDER, NAVIGATIONAL
RESTRICTIONS WITHIN THE NEW LOS CONTEXT, GEOGRAPHICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNTIED
STATES 77 (1986).
As the number of states claiming an EEZ continues to grow, law of the sea experts
are becoming increasingly aware of differences in state practice, as evidenced by
domestic legislation .... There are two general categories of these differences or
'inconsistencies' with the Convention. One is the failure on the part of certain
states, in their legislation, to specify international community rights that are guar-
anteed in the Convention; a second is a deliberate revocation of those rights.
Id.
See also id. at 91, Thle. 11 (listing 47 states whose EEZ proclamations and/or national laws
appear inconsistent with the UNCLOS provisions regarding freedoms of navigation and over-
flight, reprinted in ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, tbl. A2-7). But see Caminos,
supra note 10, at 10 (discussing Latin American states: "Recent trends demonstrate that har-
monization of domestic law with international law will be a reality in the near future.").
187. Nadelson, supra note 7, at 479.
188. For discussions concerning defining national interests, see, e.g., Robert Blackwill, A
Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990's and Beyond, in EUROPE
IN GLOBAL CHANGE 100 (Wermer Weidenfeld & Josef Janning, eds., 1993); ELMER PLISCHKE,
FOREIGN RELATIONS, ANALYSIS OF ITS ANATOMY 9-49 (1988); Thomas W. Robinson, A Na-
tional Interest Analysis of Sino Soviet Relations, 11 INT'L STUD. Q. 135 (1967) reprinted in
INT'L POL. AND FOREIGN POL'Y 182 (James N. Rosenau, ed., 1969); Hans J. Morgenthau, An-
other "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States, XLVI AM. POL. Sci. REV.
961 (1952).
189. Benin, Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sierra Le-
one, Somalia, Uruguay claim 200 mile territorial seas. Sierra Leone, Uruguay and Somalia,
curiously enough, have also ratified the Convention, placing their domestic law at odds with a
potential international obligation. U.N. LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No. 23, supra note 124, at
67-77.
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gation within them.' These States seek control by legal exclusion of foreign
vessels from designated coastal waters areas as may be deemed necessary. 191
India's traffic control schemes are one example;'9 2 Brazil's EEZ legislation,
which denies foreign warships entry into the Brazilian EEZ without prior
permission, is the paradigmatic example of extended territoriality under the
EEZ regime. 93 In the jurisdictional category, some coastal States seek ex-
clusion and control by claiming national security as a basis for jurisdiction
over their EEZ. 94 Although coastal State security jurisdiction in the EEZ is
not contemplated by the Convention, these States claim a legal right to limit
freedom of navigation in their EEZ on security grounds."95 North Korea's 50
nautical mile military maritime zone, which is coincident with its EEZ in the
Yellow Sea, 96 is the most extreme example of this jurisdictionally based
quasi-sovereignty. North Korea permits navigation and overflight in this
zone only with prior consent "to reliably safeguard the economic sea zone of
[North Korea] and firmly defend militarily the national interests and sover-
eignty [sic] of the country."' 9 7 Other States seem prepared to assert extended
control over coastal waters in a functional manner, omitting from their EEZ
declarations any guarantee of the fundamental freedom of navigation in their
EEZs. 9 s This omission, which in at least some cases must be knowing and
190. See Nadelson, supra note 7, at 475. Examples include Guyana, India, Mauritius,
Pakistan, and the Seychelles. Id. at 475 n.39 (citing Guyana: Maritime Boundaries Act No.
10/77, Pt. Ill § 18(B); Mauritius: Maritime Zones Act No. 13(77), Art. 9(b); Pakistan: Territo-
rial Waters and Maritime Zones Act (1976), § 6; Seychelles: Maritime Zones Act N 15/1977,
art. 9(b) (vi)). For the actual texts to these Maritime Acts and others, see SMITH, supra note
83. For other discussions of extended territoriality, see BROWN, supra note 2, at 163-64, and
Kwiatkoska, supra note 98.
191. See Nadelson, supra note 7, at 475.
192. See BROWN, supra note 2, at 165 (citing Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Ex-
clusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act 1976).
193. Law No. 8617 of 4 January 1993, on the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the ex-
clusive economic zone and the continental shelf, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN No.
23, supra note 124, at 17, 19.
194. Nadelson, supra note 7, at 475. "Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, Haiti, India, Paki-
stan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Yemen (Aden) all make security a basis of jurisdiction in their
EEZ." Id. at 475 n.41 (citing Bangladesh: Act 26/1974, Article 4(2) (a); Burma: Territorial
Sea and Maritime Zones Law 3/1977, Ch 3(11) (a); Cambodia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Statement, 31 July 1982, Article 4; Haiti: Decree No. 38/1977, Article 4; India: Maritime
Zones Act 1976, sec. 1/5/4(a); Pakistan: Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones Act, 1976,
Article 4(2) (a); Sri Lanka: Maritime Zones Law 22/1976, Article 4(2) (a); Vietnam: State-
ment, 12 May 1977, sec 2; Yemen (Aden): Act 45/1977, Article 12). See also BROWN, supra
note 2, at 165-67 (discussing legislation of Guyana, India, Mauritius, Pakistan, and the Sey-
chelles).
195. See VICUNA, supra note 2, at 151.
196. Nadelson, supra note 7, at 476. The North Korean claim is discussed in ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at § 1.5.4 and n. 54 (1997).
197. NORTH AMERICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE
SEA: TREATIES AND NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Myron H. Nordquist & Choon H. Park, eds.,
1981). See also J.R.V. PREsCOTr, MARITME JURISDICTION IN EAST ASIAN SEAS 64-69 (1987)
(discussing the North Korean claim as well as a similar claim made by China).
198. Nadelson, supra note 7, at 483. Nadelson lists in the functional category Bangla-
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deliberate, indicates that these coastal States do not find their resource rights
in equal balance with foreign States' freedoms of navigation and associated
uses. Instead, they would give greater weight to their sovereign rights over
resources than to the rights of foreign States to the exercise of high seas
freedoms; in the event of conflict, the coastal State preferences would take
priority at the expense of the navigational rights of other states.' 99
Although not every coastal State has used domestic legislation to claim
greater legal control over its EEZ than contemplated by the Convention,'
some States have done so, in one way or another. Indeed, one commentator
finds even the United States itself to have hinted that it would find its EEZ
rights outweigh foreign State freedoms of navigation and overflight in the
event of conflict.2"1 Some coastal States are using strong domestic laws to
turn their EEZ from a zone of resource regulation to a "zone of absolute
State control: in effect, an area of sovereignty.- 20 2 It is often the less devel-
oped countries that make the strongest claims, seeking to use the law to
achieve the exclusion and control they cannot yet ensure with weapons and
technology. 203 Many States thus use domestic EEZ legislation as a conven-
ient vehicle to assert their perceived underlying national interests, whether in
territorial expansion, self-defense and national security, economic well-
being, or environmental protection and resource preservation. 2' They do so,
as Nadelson concludes, because the Convention's EEZ regime "is not suffi-
ciently responsive to coastal State needs ... much of the problem with the
desh, Cape Verde, Colombia, Comoros, Cook Islands, France, Guiena-Bissau, Haiti, Iceland,
Malaysia, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Western Samoa, Sri Lanka, Togo and Viet-
nam. Id. at 483 n.66. See also ATrARD, supra note 2, at 81-83 (discussing and listing coastal
state claims that do not refer to freedoms of movement and communication).
199. See Nadelson, supra note 7, at 483.
200. See ATrARD, supra note 2, at 149 (Cuba, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, and Thailand
explicitly recognize freedoms of other states in their EEZ).
201. See id. at 83, (noting that the United States' "1983 EEZ proclamation states that
within the zone, freedoms of navigation and overflight are to be enjoyed 'without prejudice to
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States....") (quoting Presidential Proclama-
tion No. 5030 (Mar. 10, 1983)). However, the complete quote is:
Without prejudice to the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the United States, the
Exclusive Economic Zone remains an area beyond the territory and territorial sea
of the United States in which all States enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation,
overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea.
Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10605 (Mar. 10, 1983). The President's
Ocean Policy Statement of the same date states, "Within this Zone all nations will continue to
enjoy the high seas rights and freedoms that are not resource related, including the freedoms
of navigation and overflight." Statement by the President, U.S. Oceans Policy, 19 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 383-85 (Mar 10, 1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464 (1983).
202. Nadelson, supra note 7, at 483.
203. See id.
204. Cf. Kwiatkowska, supra note 146, at 175 (arguing that the risk of gradual erosion of
navigational and other communications freedoms in the 200 mile EEZ is, in part, exemplified
by coastal State claims to sovereignty over the continental shelf).
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EEZ results from the perceived threat to the coastal State posed by other
States.""2 5 The Convention does not assuage coastal State fears, and so some
States act independently of it to protect themselves.
Thus, coastal States have by no means or measure declared legal acqui-
escence to the unilateral military presence in their coastal waters of foreign
naval forces. One commentator, writing in 1990, noted that, "More than 30
nations currently claim extended jurisdiction of one sort or another that pur-
ports to restrict military activities in their 200 mile zones." 6 Domestic de-
claratory EEZ practice continues to manifest a continuing interest in assert-
ing some sort of sovereign control of coastal waters out to at least 200
miles,2"7 and suggests that some coastal states feel some degree of apprehen-
sion and distrust related to the unilateral activities of foreign naval powers in
these waters. Like the history of the development of the EEZ, and the legis-
lative history of the Convention, some domestic State practice suggests that
coastal States perceive a strong national interest in controlling their coastal
waters beyond the 12 mile territorial sea, and those believing themselves
lacking the military power to protect that interest seek to maintain control by
legal exclusion of foreign States.
20 8
Notwithstanding some difference of opinion evident regarding naval ac-
tivities in EEZs, the United States continues to aver its complete right to uni-
lateral, unlimited naval operations in foreign EEZs (in accordance with its
stated position as to interpretation of the law of the sea with respect to free-
dom of navigation in EEZs). 9 "Under the Freedom of Navigation (FON)
program, the United States undertakes diplomatic action at several levels to
preserve its rights under international law .... When appropriate, the United
States delivers formal diplomatic protests addressing specific maritime
claims that are inconsistent with international law." 20 In addition, the
United States conducts naval operations designed to assert rights with re-
spect to freedom of navigation and operation of U.S. warships within foreign
EEZs. 211 Some naval operations have become highly publicized, such as the
Black Sea bumping incident between U.S. and Soviet ships in 1988, and the
205. Id. at 486.
206. Rose, supra note 11, at 134.
207. Perhaps beyond 200 miles, as well. For discussions of coastal state control creeping
beyond 200 miles, see Kwaitkowska, supra note 146; Vicuna, supra note 146.
208. See Felipe H. Paolillo, The Exclusive Zone in Latin American Practice and Legisla-
tion, 26 OcEAN DEv & INT'L LAW 105, 107-08 (1995). ("It should not be surprising, then, that
coastal States tend to respond to the questions the Convention left unanswered or with respect
to which participants at the Conference were forced to result to 'constructive ambiguity' by
developing a practice that better meets their national interests."). See also Caminos, supra
note 10, at 29.
209. For the U.S. position, see supra note 150
210. LIMITS lN THE SEAs No. 112, supra note 181, at 1.
211. Id. at 1, 2.
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shoot down of Libyan military jet aircraft by U.S. Navy warplanes in the
Gulf of Sidra in 1986.212
These assertions are designed to "exhibit U.S. determination not to ac-
quiesce in excessive claims to maritime jurisdiction by other States. 21 3 With
respect to EEZs, the United States identifies the following kinds of claims as
excessive:
* [C]laims to jurisdiction over maritime areas in excess of 12
miles, such as security zones, that purport to restrict non-
resource related high seas freedoms;
* [E]xclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims inconsistent with Part
V of the LOS Convention;
* [C]laims requiring advance notification or authorization for in-
nocent passage of warships and naval auxiliaries through the
territorial sea or EEZ or applying discriminatory requirements
to such vessels .... 214
In 1982, the United States made diplomatic protests of seven EEZ
claims it found overbroad and inconsistent with Part V of the Convention.
21 5
In 1983, the United States made one protest.216 The United States protested
the Iranian EEZ claim in 1994, the Pakistani EEZ claim in 1997, the Malay-
sian EEZ claim in 1998, and in 1999, the Indian EEZ claims. 217 The United
212. Id. See generally John W. Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black Sea Bump-
ing Incident, How "Innocent" Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 MiL. L. REv. 137 (1992), and
Yehuda Z. Blum, The Gulf of Sidra Incident, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 668 (1986) (discussing these
incidents in light of international law).
213. LIMrTs IN THE SEAS No. 112, supra note 181, at 2. For a good discussion of the FON
program, see Rolph, supra note 202, at 146-49.
The United States' commitment to preserving and protecting maritime rights and
freedoms is no better exemplified than in its Freedom of Navigation (FON) pro-
gram. Recognizing that the many navigational rights it currently enjoys may be
lost over time if not used, this program charts a steady course for actively asserting
these freedoms globally to ensure their continued viability. Because the United
States did not sign or ratify the UNCLOS III, but nevertheless accepts its naviga-
tional principles as customary international law, a continuing obligation exists to
exercise these rights to preserve them. At the heart of customary international law
is assertion and activism. In other words, '[t]o protect our navigational rights and
freedoms we must exercise them.' The Freedom of Navigation program accom-
plishes this by targeting and operationally challenging maritime claims that are in
contravention of international law.
Id. at 146-49 (citations omitted).
214. LIMITs IN THE SEAS No. 112, supra note 181, at 3
215. Id. at 38- 39. The U.S. sent diplomatic protests to Barbados, Burma, Grenada, Guy-
ana, Mauritius, Pakistan, and Seychelles. Id.
216. Id. (protesting India).
217. MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 12 . The U.S. conducted pro-
tested claims in Iran in 1998, India twice in 1999, Pakistan in 1986, 1991 and 1998, Brazil in
1983 and 1988, and Malaysia in 1998, 1999, and 2000. Id.
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States has frequently conducted operations asserting freedom of navigation
in foreign EEZs to demonstrate its non-acquiescence to all of these claims.2 8
Related protests include coastal States claims of national security inter-
ests in the region from the end of the territorial sea at 12 miles seaward to 24
miles (the contiguous zone), which is also part of the EEZ.2 19 In 1982, the
United States protested a Vietnamese decree, which requires advance notifi-
cation, consent, and essentially innocent passage for military vessels in the
Vietnamese contiguous zone.220 In 1989, "the United States protested Haiti's
attempt to expand the competence of its contiguous zone to include protec-
tion of national security interests."221 The United States has protested similar
claims made by Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, the
Yemen Arab Republic, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.222
In 1990, the United States sent a diplomatic note to Namibia expressing
"concern over Namibia's claim to establish control within the full extent of
its 200-mile exclusive economic zone to prevent infringement of its fiscal,
customs, immigration, and health laws. 223
As discussed above, however, despite this diplomatic and operational
activity, while some States have softened their claims, many have not yet
done so.2 1 Indeed, the trend, as illustrated by the declarations of India, Paki-
stan, Malaysia, Iran, and Brazil, is one of coastal States claiming increas-
ingly extended control over their EEZs and beyond. 2" The importance
218. See LIMrrs IN Tm SEAS No 112, supra note 181, at 2 ("U.S. military ships and air-
craft have exercised their rights and freedom... against objectionable claims of more than 35
countries at the rate of some 30-40 per year.").
219. Compare UNCLOS art. 3 ([Territorial Sea ... not exceeding 12 miles...) with
UNCLOS art. 55 ('The [EEZ] is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea.. .). See
also UNCLOS art. 33 ("In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea ... the coastal State may
exercise the control necessary to.. .prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.... The contiguous zone
may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the [coast].").
220. LIMITs IN THE SEAS No 112, supra note 181, at 35 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 34.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 35. The U.S. diplomatic protest stated:
As recognized in customary international law and as reflected in articles 33 and 56
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the right of a
coastal state to prevent infringement of its fiscal, customs, immigration, and health
laws within its territory or territorial sea does not extend beyond 24 nautical miles
from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Id. (citing Diplomatic Note No. 196, Dec. 24, 1990 from the American Embassy at Wind-
hoek, and noting that Germany also protested the Namibian claim in October, 1990).
224. See supra notes 12, 13, 186-208 and accompanying text.
225. But see Caminos, supra note 10, at 23
As a result of these different forms in the domestic law and in the interpretative
declarations under Article 310, there is a lack of uniformity in the [Latin Ameri-
can] region, especially with regard to certain rights and jurisdiction in the exclu-
sive economic zone.... Noticeably, the current trend shows a clear decline of the
territorialist approach.
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coastal States place upon control of their EEZs is illustrated by the 116 coun-
tries that deploy patrol and coastal combatant ships primarily to police their
EEZs. 226 Moreover, of the 1,700 warships expected to be built during the
next few years, a majority will be smaller, coastal patrol vessels and cor-
vettes, suggesting even further coastal State emphasis on control of their
EEZs.227 Pacific Rim nations are increasingly investing in these kinds of en-
hanced naval capabilities, and even France, Britain, and Italy are considering
plans to enhance their capabilities for coastal defense. 22 1 Some opine that
developing countries are increasingly arming themselves with anti-ship mis-
siles, apparently motivated by trends in the development of the international
law of the sea.229
V. RECENT CONFLICTS WITHIN FOREIGN EEZS
A recent and telling illustration of a this trend and of the importance
some coastal States place upon control of military activities in the EEZ oc-
curred in April 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet intercepted and then col-
lided with an American patrol aircraft over the Chinese EEZ near Hainan is-
land.23 ° The collision was between a US EP-3E Aries II reconnaissance
plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet some 60 miles southeast of China's
Hainan Island. 231 The Chinese fighter crashed into the sea and its pilot died;
the U.S. airplane made an emergency landing on a Chinese military airfield
on Hainan Island. The PRC and the United States views on the law with re-
spect to military activities in the Chinese EEZ differed.23 2 China's Foreign
Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao asserted that the U.S. aircraft violated the
convention's principle of free overflight of the EEZ because it posed a seri-
ous threat to China's national security and did not respect China's rights.
233
Id.
See also generally Bourbonnier & Haeck, supra note 13, at 958 ("Concerning Article 33, an
interpretive polemic arises over possible restrictions to military exercises, and consequently
military training overflights, occurring over the excusive economic zone."). Italy, Germany
and the Netherlands' EEZ declarations disagree with those of Brazil, India, Malaysia and
Pakistan. Id. See also Caminos, supra note 10, at 25-29.
226. Frank Barnaby, The Role of Navies in the 1990s and Beyond, 10 OCEAN YEARBOOK
229, 237-38 (Elisabeth M. Borgese, et al. eds., 1993).
227. Robert Holzer, Turning an Eye to Coasts, NAVY TmFs, November 22, 1993, at 30
(citing AMI International as the source of the estimate on numbers of ships).
228. Id.
229. MORELL, supra note 16, at 195 (citing James A. Hazlatt, Strait Shooting, 108 U.S.
NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 70-73 (1982)).
230. Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Some See Double Standard in China Flap, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 18, 2001, at Al.
231. Id.
232. Id. See also U.S. Seriously Violates International Law, Xinhua General News Ser-
vice, Apr. 16, 2001, available at 2001 WL 19265374.
233. Edith M. Lederer, China, U.S. Disagree on Law of Sea, AP Online, Apr. 7, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17992570.
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The United States disagreed. U.S. State Department spokesman Richard
Boucher explained that, "because the aircraft was beyond the 12-mile air and
sea limit of Chinese territory, under international law 'as reflected in the
Law of the Sea Convention, it was entitled to operate in the location of the
collision over international waters.' "234 He explained that traditional mili-
tary activities are legally permissible in international airspace, and by impli-
cation defined the airspace above the EEZ as international airspace. 235 He
added that the U.S. activities "were conducted with due regard to China's
rights and duties as a coastal state. 2 36
At least one Chinese academic rejected the American argument, making
the argument that the U.S. "abused" its right of overflight in the EEZ. Li Oin
argued that because military reconnaissance flights by unarmed aircraft over
the Chinese EEZ constitute threats to Chinese national security, they are a
provocation to Chinese national sovereignty and are therefore without proper




237. U.S. Seriously Violates International Law, supra note 232. This news report, from
an official Chinese news agency, and therefore providing a good insight into the official
Chinese position on the issue, discusses an article by Li Oin, entitled "A Look at Plane
Collision Incident From Perspective of International Law." As discussed by Xinhua, Li
Oin makes an argument badly mangling mainstream views of the law. He states:
In accordance with the current of international law, although foreign aircraft enjoy
the freedom to fly over the exclusive economic zone of a certain country, such
freedom is by no means unrestricted and foreign aircraft have to observe the rele-
vant rules of the international law while enjoying the freedom of overflight....
According to Article 58 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea promul-
gated in 1982, foreign aircraft enjoy the freedom of overflight under the relevant
provisions of the Convention .... Section Three of the article made it clear that
foreign planes, while enjoying the freedom of overflight over an exclusive eco-
nomic zone of other countries, "shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal
State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of inter-
national law in so far as they are not incompatible with this part." According to Ar-
ticle 56 of the Convention, the coastal country concerned not only has the right to
exploit, utilize, maintain and administer natural resources in its exclusive eco-
nomic zone, but also enjoys other rights concerning exclusive economic zones laid
down by the Convention. ... [T]he U.S. plane did not exercise a common flight
over China's exclusive economic zone, but a reconnaissance mission .... These
activities constitute threats to Chinese national security and peaceful order, and the
provocation to Chinese national sovereignty. The U.S. act violates the fundamental
principles of international law that stands for all states to respect sovereignty and
territorial integrity of each other.... In accordance with Article 301 of the Con-
vention, a certain country, while enjoying its rights or carrying out its duties stipu-
lated by the Convention, "shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of
United Nations".... [A] plane of a state, while it exercises freedom of overflight
in the air over the exclusive economic zone of the other state, should respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the coastal state. It can't infringe upon na-
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the Chinese legal argument is not well supported by the law of the sea238 is
less important than is the Chinese decision that its national interest in control
of its EEZ counsels that it be made. China apparently desires to expand its
sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the EEZ beyond the scope contemplated
by the Convention.
At about the same time, China also objected to military survey activities
of a U.S. naval auxiliary vessel operating in the Chinese EEZ. According to
an April 2001 story run by the Herald Sun, "A Chinese warship chased a
United States Navy ship out of the waters of China's east coast nine days be-
fore the collision of a US spy plane and a Chinese jet. 2 39 The newspaper
further reported that a Chinese frigate intercepted the USNS Bowditch in in-
ternational waters on the Yellow Sea on March 23. The Chinese warship
forced the U.S. Navy survey ship to depart the Chinese EEZ.2
India has similarly objected to the conduct of military survey activities
in its EEZ.24 In March 2001, the Indian Defence Minister, George Fernan-
des, informed reporters that "India has protested to the governments of the
United States and Britain that their warships were conducting unauthorized
operations in our exclusive economic zone." 2 According to the report, a US
navy survey vessel, again the USNS Bowditch, was detected 30 nautical
miles from Nicobar Island, an Indian possession.3 The vessel "indicated it
was carrying out oceanographic survey operations." 2' Defense Minister
Fernandes also objected to the conduct of a UK Royal Navy Vessel, HMS
Scott, sighted 190 nautical miles off Diu and later near Porbadnar between
tional security and peaceful order of the coastal state, and any act ignoring the
above rights of the coastal country will abuse the freedom of overflight
Id. For a thorough discussion of military aircraft and international law, see generally Bour-
bonnier & Haeck, supra note 13.
238. John Temple Swing, a member of the U.S. delegation that helped draft UNCLOS,
dismissed the Chinese claim. "If it was in territorial waters, then they would have a point," he
said in an interview. 'But it isn't and no lawyer--other than one paid by the Chinese govern-
ment-would seriously dispute that."' Lederer, supra note 233. According to Professor Ivan
Shearer, Challis Professor of International Law, University of Sydney, Australia, the Chinese
analysis is "based on a flawed understanding of the meaning of article 301 of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea by which the writer inflates the meaning of article 58
to include security concerns.... Taken to its logical conclusion, the argument would exclude
the operation of warships and military aircraft everywhere, even on the high seas." Ivan
Shearer, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case of Aerial Surveil-
lance, Address at Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law Conference in Melbourne, Australia
(February 2002) (on file with the authors).
239. John Leicester, Chinese Chase US Ship; Jet Crash Part of Spy Game, HERALD SUN,
Apr. 4, 2001, at 32.
240. Id.
241. See Indian Government Considering Allowing 100% FDI in Power Trade, ASIA
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January 12 and 16, 2001. "4 HIS Scott indicated it was carrying out mili-
tary survey and declined to furnish any further information.
The incident in India's EEZ highlights a further area of potential conten-
tion and confrontation. UNCLOS Article 56 provides that "the coastal state
has... jurisdiction [in the EEZ] as provided for in the relevant provisions of
this Convention with regard to... marine scientific research."'  Article
246 requires the consent of the coastal State for marine scientific research
within the EEZ.2 7 The U.S. view, however, is that military survey activities
are not marine scientific research, but rather are naval activities that may be
conducted in the EEZ beyond the territorial sea, and are not subject to
coastal State regulation. As stated in the U.S. Navy's The Commander's
Handbook on the Law of Military Operation: "Although coastal nation con-
sent must be obtained in order to conduct marine scientific research in its ex-
clusive economic zone, the coastal nation cannot regulate hydrographic sur-
veys or military surveys conducted beyond its territorial sea, nor can it
require notification of such activities." 2
Continued disagreement, confrontation, and dispute over naval and mili-
tary activities in the EEZ are inevitable. How to best resolve that inevitable
conflict is the question. The best answer is continued international dialogue
of the type that settled a dispute between the United States and the former
Soviet Union over the right of warships to conduct innocent passage in terri-
torial seas without providing prior notice or seeking consent.249 That dispute
began with the famous "Black Sea Bumping" incident mentioned earlier, and
ended with a "Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Un-
ion of Soviet Socialist Republics. '25 The Joint Statement included a "Uni-
form Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Pas-
sage," in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that "All
ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of pro-
pulsion, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in ac-
cordance with international law, for which neither prior notification nor au-
thorization is required.- 251 This dispute over the law of the sea was handled
245. Id.
246. UNCLOS art. 56.
247. UNCLOS art. 246(2) ("Marine scientific research in the [EEZ]... shall be con-
ducted with the consent of the coastal State.").
248. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at 2-20, §2.4.2.2. See generally U.N.
OFFICE FOR OcEANs AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA: MARINE
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (1991); ALFRED H.A. SooNs,
MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 157 (1982).
249. Rolph, supra note 212, at 162-63.
250. Joint Statement by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics with Attached Uniform Interpretation of Rules of International Law Governing In-
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entirely outside of the dispute settlement regime of the UN Convention on
the Law of the Sea, which was not in effect at that time.252 Given the poor
utility of the Treaty's dispute settlement mechanism's concerning disagree-
ments over military activities, this provides a useful model for future use. Bi-
lateral and multi-lateral dialogue and agreement will be the key to dispute
resolution and dispute avoidance over military activities in EEZs in the post-
Law of the Sea Treaty world, just as it was in the world before UNCLOS.
VI. RESOLVING CONFLICT IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Among the notable accomplishments of the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea was the foresight of the Convention's drafters
regarding the need for dispute resolution mechanisms for this detailed and
complex international accord. Part XV of the Convention provides compre-
hensive details regarding the settlement of disputes on the basis of equity
and equally comprehensive language regarding dispute resolution mecha-
nisms.253 Annex VI of the Convention establishes The International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea as one body for dispute resolution between and
among members.
254
The conciliation procedures provided by various deliberative bodies,
and especially by the Law of the Sea Tribunal, have been successfully util-
ized by a number of nations in order to peacefully settle their disputes on the
oceans. 255 Unfortunately, this dispute resolution mechanism is likely to be
unavailable when issues of military activities in the exclusive economic zone
arise between a coastal State and a flag State. Indeed, in his letter of submit-
tal recommending that the Convention be transmitted to the U.S. Senate for
its advice and consent to accession and ratification, then Secretary of State
Warren Christopher explained:
Subject to limited exceptions, the Convention excludes from binding dis-
pute settlement disputes relating to the sovereign rights of coastal States
252. UNCLOS entered into force Nov. 16, 1994. See supra note 1.
253. UNCLOS arts. 277-99.
254. UNCLOS Annex VI.
255. See, e.g., MV. Saiga No. 2 Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 1999 ITLOS No. 2 (Jul.
1), 38 I.L.M. 1323 (1999); Grand Prince Case (Belize v. France) 2001 ITLOS No. 8 (Apr.
20). These cases and others can be found on the web site of the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea at http:llwww.itlos.org. According to its Oct. 18, 2001 press release, available
on its web site:
The Tribunal has delivered orders and judgments in eight cases. In its judgments
the Tribunal has dealt with a wide variety of issues, involving the prompt release
of vessels and crews, the prescription of legally binding provisional measures, and
procedural and substantive issues relating to the registration of vessels, genuine
link, exhaustion of local remedies, hot pursuit, use of force and reparation.
Press Release, ITLOS/Press 58, First Five Years of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, (Oct. 18,
2001) at http://www.itlos.org.
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with respect to the living resources in their EEZs. In addition, the Conven-
tion permits a State to opt out of binding dispute settlement procedures
with respect to one or more enumerated categories of disputes, namely
disputes regarding maritime boundaries between neighboring States, dis-
putes concerning military activities and certain law enforcement activities,
and disputes in respect of which the United Nations Security Council is
exercising the functions assigned to it by the Charter of the United Na-
tions.25
6
Article 298 of the Convention, "Optional Exceptions to the Applicabil-
ity of Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions" states:
When signing, ratifying or acceding to the Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under
section 1, declare in writing that it does not accept any one or more of the
procedures provided for in section 2 with respect to ... disputes concern-
ing military activities, including military activities by government vessels
and aircraft engaged in non-commercial service, and disputes concerning
law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights orjurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal.... 7
A number of States, in ratifying the Convention, have chosen to declare
that they do not accept procedures for disputes concerning military activities.
As of October 16, 2001, those States include Cape Verde, Chile, France, It-
aly, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Tunisia."5 8 Others, such
as India, Pakistan and The United Kingdom, have reserved judgment, per-
haps waiting to make a declaration if and when the issue presents itself.259
Given the language of Article 298, and the concomitant proclivity on the part
of maritime nations---especially the United States, which is not yet even a
party to the Convention-to treat their naval vessels as sovereign entities ex-
empt from the normal obligations of commercial vessels plying the seas, it is
highly probable that these maritime nations would invoke Article 298 in
every case.260 Thus, when disputes arise regarding the military activities of a
flag State in the EEZ of a coastal State, it is extraordinarily unlikely that the
256. Warren Christopher, Letter of Submittal, Department of State, Washington, Sept.
23, 1994, reprinted in ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at 1-31, Annex A1-2.
257. UNCLOS art. 298 (emphasis added).
258. THE LAW OF THE SEA: DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND TO THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA (United Nations Sales No. E.97.V.3) available at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/conv-
ention agreements/concention declarations.
259. Id.
260. See Warren Christopher, Letter of Submittal, Department of State, Washington,
Sept. 23, 1994, reprinted in ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 150, at 1-31, Annex A1-2.
Secretary of State Christopher recommends that the United States make the following declara-
tion: "The Government of the United States of America declares, in accordance with para-
graph 1 Article 298, that it does not accept the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part
XV with respect to the categories of disputes set forth in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of that
paragraph." Id.
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flag State would submit to the dispute resolution mechanisms of the Conven-
tion.
As has been suggested, even though military activities in the EEZ pre-
sent a potentially highly charged issue without a concomitant means of arbi-
trating or litigating disputes, inevitable confrontation and conflict can be
mitigated. In our view, the issues surrounding military activities in this zone
must be vetted in the international community before such activities are con-
ducted and allowed to result in confrontation and conflict.
In Working with Other Nations, a U.S. Navy strategy white-paper, Navy
strategists suggest that multi-lateral, combined naval operations with
friendly nations is the preferable way to further political, economic, and se-
curity objectives in an economically and politically interdependent world.26
United States national security continues to require forward naval presence
to ensure that information, capital, raw material, and manufactured goods
flow freely across borders and oceans.262 One way to secure forward naval
presence in foreign EEZs without contention and confrontation is by "estab-
lishing relations with security partners in peacetime before the onset of a cri-
sis. '263 A useful legal tool in support of this strategy is to create consensus
on the law through multi-lateral cooperation and agreement.2 4
The United States has followed such an approach to resolve a conten-
tious issue in another area of international law, which, like the issue of naval
activities in EEZs, involves a difference of opinion with developing States as
to the legitimate rule of international law. The question of property rights
and the international rule of law in cases of State expropriation of alien
owned property has been vigorously contested.265 The United States has
sought to establish consensus on the law through its foreign investment pro-
gram.266 Using a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) program, investment pro-
tection provisions contained in bilateral treaties of Friendship, Commerce,
and Navigation (FCN), and multilateral activity in the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development and other multilateral trade negotiation
fora (e.g. WTO), the United States seeks to ensure high international stan-
dards of protection for intellectual property, and to obtain international con-
261. John Burlage, Making Friends and Influencing other Navies, NAVY TIMES, Nov. 1,
1993, at 19 (citing WORKING WITH OTHER NATIONS).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 11, at 91 n.76 (noting that the U.S. is not just relying on
the FON program, but also seeking regional and multi-lateral cooperation as a means to pro-
tect navigational rights in the EEZ).
265. See generally BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 833-
60 (1991) (excerpts and discussion of relevant international material).
266. See 89 FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY, DEP'T ST. BuLL. 32
(June 1989). See generally DAVIS R. ROBINSON, 84 TREATY PROTECTION OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT, DEP'T ST. BuLL. 60 (Jan. 1984); ROBERT R. WILSON, U.S. COMMIERCIAL
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95-125 (1960); Herman Walker, Jr., Treaties for the En-
couragement and Protection of Foreign Investment, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229 (1956).
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sensus on a rule of international law requiring prompt, adequate and effec-
tive compensation for expropriated property.267 As of 1990, the United States
had concluded BIT treaties with 10 developing nations, and had FCN treaties
in force with most industrialized States. 6 This is but one model for interna-
tional cooperation.
Additionally, there are a number of existing fora available in which the
groundwork for agreements with respect to naval and military activities in
EEZs might be laid. One such forum is international conferences and sym-
posia where issues such as military activities in the exclusive economic zone
can be discussed in between and among the representatives of a number of
nations in an open and collegial manner. The annual United States Pacific
Command's Military Operations and Law Conference, which brings together
the military, diplomatic and policy representatives from over two dozen Pa-
cific Rim nations, is an ideal vehicle for socializing both coastal and mari-
time nations to the imperative of finding accommodation regarding military
activities in the EEZ.
Another vehicle for defusing conflict regarding this issue is the conduct
of multi-lateral naval exercises in the EEZ-specifically exercises including
the coastal nation bordering that exclusive economic zone along with other
nations. This would involve coastal states in conducting naval exercises in
their own EEZs along with forces from other navies.269 This methodology
has the benefit of taking the 'theory' of conducting military activities in the
EEZ and putting it into day-to-day practice. The United States-sponsored bi-
annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise is one example of multi-
national exercises where the practice of conducting military activities in the
EEZ could be socialized in a way that diffuses potential contention. Another
example is the series of bilateral Cooperation and Readiness Afloat
(CARAT) exercises undertaken annual in the Western Pacific by United
States Seventh Fleet units with Asian Pacific countries. Another more-
proscribed forum might be the many bilateral and multi-lateral exercises
held by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member
States within the EEZs of member States.
267. See International Investment, DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH (July 29 1991), available
in LExis, INTLAW Library, DSTATE File.
268. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 246, at 836. BIT treaties in force are with Bangla-
desh, Cameroon, Egypt, Granada, Haiti, Morocco, Panama, Senegal, Turkey, and Zaire. Id.
269. Some coastal States, such as Brazil, which purport to require prior permission for
the conduct of naval exercises in their EEZ, might argue that their participation in such an ac-
tivity in their own EEZ constitutes consent to the activity and therefore does not impeach their
claim. Thus, these multi-lateral exercises would not in every case serve also as assertion is of
navigational rights against excessive claims. They would, however, help to establish the fun-
damentally peaceful nature of naval exercises and maneuvers, and de-sensitize objectors to
the activity, which over time, might mitigate their concerns and obviate their objections re-
garding national security, which seem to be at the heart of most States' efforts to expand their
maritime jurisdiction.
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Beyond these exercises, bi-lateral naval talks, such as those ongoing be-
tween the United States and China under the auspices of the Military Mari-
time Consultative Agreement, as well as multi-lateral talks, such as the meet-
ings of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)
Maritime Cooperation Working Group, create opportunities for maritime
professionals to discuss the issues, understand differing viewpoints, and vet
potential solutions before they become contentious issues at sea.
As coastal and maritime States refine their understanding of their re-
spective rights and responsibilities within the EEZ under UNCLOS, the po-
tential exists that many nations will find a balance that accommodates the
concerns of the coastal States while preserving freedom of navigation. There
will likely remain, however, some few States that may feel compelled to
continue to take a more dogmatic approach regarding military activities in
their EEZs.
In these cases, some sort of international, multi-lateral, ongoing freedom
of navigation operations in these zones might be necessary to persuade those
'persistent objectors' that these activities in the EEZ do not pose a threat.
Concurrently, it would be incumbent on those nations participating in free-
dom of navigation operations to conduct military activities in a manner that
could not be perceived as a threat to the coastal nation. This issue can only
be resolved through a balance of the right to conduct these activities and do-
ing the right thing.
When all is said and done the salient fact remains that the EEZ is an im-
portant international area and that vast oceanic areas, that were once the high
seas, are now included in the EEZ. Clearly, the past decade has sharpened
the international focus on the EEZ and on military activities therein.
While a limited number of coastal States have attempted to exercise
control of their EEZs by making what some maritime States consider egre-
gious claims purporting to restrict military activities, some maritime States
have continued to assert their rights in this zone to an extent that might ap-
pear to the coastal State with excessive claims to be an extreme infringement
upon the coastal State's rights in this zone. The dispute resolution mecha-
nisms of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are in-
sufficient to successfully litigate such disputes. Therefore, the international
community is left to make peaceful resolution of the contentious issues re-
garding military activities in the EEZ a matter of priority.
Most States share national interests in freedom of navigation for ocean
going commerce, and in the promotion of world order through international
law. These interests are related to, and mutually supportive of, a rule of in-
ternational law that permits forward presence of naval forces in coastal wa-
ters around the world: in other words, naval activities in EEZs. A stable sys-
tem of international law is good for trade, and a strong Navy, able to even-
handedly defend legal entitlements by its presence at sea, is good for a stable
system of international law. The cooperative approach is the preferable ap-
proach.
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To the extent the United States continues to have a need for unrestricted,
legal access for its naval forces up to the territorial waters of all the countries
of the world, we believe it should continue to use vehicles such as the Free-
dom of Navigation Program to assert these rights, but should also supple-
ment this with other arrangements and understandings with foreign security
partners. A sufficiently dense network of such arrangements and understand-
ings, followed by consistent practice, will ensure the vitality of customary
norms. In the end, it is our view that this is an approach that will ensure the
best balance among an ongoing network of lawful naval and military activi-
ties, stable international law, freedom of navigation for ocean-going com-
merce, and is an approach that will protect interests common to all in an in-
ternationally interdependent world.
49
Galdorisi, and Kaufman,: Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: Preventing Un
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2002
302 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32
50
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 32, No. 2 [2002], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol32/iss2/4
